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ABSTRACT

This study examines what the effects would be of making public schools part of a general-purpose local government, rather than an independent governmental unit, as is now usually the case. Chapter 1 discusses general trends in local government reorganization and their implications for the school-local government relationship. Chapter 2 summarizes the arguments for and against a close relationship between schools and local governments. Chapter 3 describes the variables in the structural relationship between schools and local governments. Chapter 4 examines the available data on each variable and discusses the influence of these variables on the educational system. Chapter 5 explores some additional questions regarding the importance of the school-local government relationship and suggests some directions for future research. The appendix summarizes statistical data on the relationship between public schools and local governments in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. An extensive bibliography of relevant publications is also included. (Author/JG)

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THE EFFECTS OF THE SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP ON EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES

Ruth Scott

EA 008 230

PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

How closely should public education be tied to city government? This issue, which was a lively source of controversy 50 to 80 years ago, has been quiet during most of the past five decades. But now, because of a growing interest in reorganizing urban government into two tiers of general-purpose government, the existing separation of public education from local government should be reconsidered. The two-tier structure is being suggested as a means of reconciling two apparently contradictory reform proposals: the consolidation, and the decentralization of local governments. Tying public education more closely to the general-purpose governments may make both of the proposed tiers more effective.

There are complaints that local government is both too fragmented to be effective and too distant to be responsive. Until recently the concern about fragmentation, about governments too small and too specialized to deal with complex metropolitan problems, held the spotlight. Such concern supported a conventional wisdom that a general-purpose metropolitan government should be the goal of local government reform. The last ten years, however, have complicated the reform movements by introducing demands, particularly from minorities, to decentralize the large urban governments—and school systems—in order to make them more responsive to local needs and values. The conflict between these two reform proposals has given rise to a new proposal, approaching the status of another conventional wisdom, that the many local and

special-purpose governments should be replaced by two tiers of general-purpose government, the lower tier being community (or neighborhood) governments and the higher tier being a single metropolitan government.

The two-tier system could accomplish much of what is sought by proponents of consolidation and the proponents of decentralization. If it eliminates all the existing local governments except the school districts, which have so far been ignored by most proposals, it would meet the purposes of consolidation by substantially reducing the number of governments and hence the problem of intergovernmental coordination. It thus would provide a metropolitan government for metropolitan problems, remove the narrow perspective of special-purpose governments, and simplify the public's task of knowing who is responsible for local government. At the same time, it would meet the purposes of decentralization by creating a new neighborhood government having significant powers and being directly responsible to the neighborhood residents.

But this new proposal also has problems, probably serious enough to justify a reevaluation of the assumption that there should be separation of public schools and local government, even though such reevaluation is politically difficult because of the near-sacred status of the the present separation. One key problem is that the neighborhood governments must have strong public interest and support if they are to be effective and if they are to be strong enough to hold their own against the metropolitan government. While concern over police patrols or street lighting may generate spurts of pressure to establish such

governments, such single-issue concerns seldom sustain the level of interest necessary for broad and active participation over the long term. A number of concerns, generating frequent and significant issues which in turn generate substantial public interest, are needed to sustain the necessary public support of the neighborhood governments. A second, and equally important, problem is that of minimizing the possibility that one community group may become strong enough to ignore the reasonable interests of other groups. This is a possibility which increases with smaller governments. It can be reduced by broadening participation and the range of issues with which the government deals, thus reducing the probability that a majority faction can hold together on all issues. Nothing could reduce either problem so much as including education in the responsibilities of the community government. Education creates more interest, among more people, than does any other function of local government. It could do much to create the critical mass of public interest and the number of issues needed for an effective and equitable community-level government.

There are two other reasons for now looking at education in this context. First, it has been a major target of the decentralization movement, particularly in New York City where attempts to decentralize the schools made decentralization a major local and national issue. Second, the Serrano vs. Priest decision, and the restructuring of education of finance which it prompted, are showing ways to remove one of the most important shortcomings of decentralization--the unequal distribution of financial resources.

These are possible reasons for reconsidering the separation of education and local governments. Some evidence can probably be gathered to help understand how good these reasons are. However, only by actual experience can their validity be tested. Since even experimentation will be opposed by many, the most important evidence to collect now is that which applies to the concerns of those likely to raise the most reasonable objections. These persons probably are the educators concerned that closer ties between schools and local governments will hurt the schools. The purpose of this study has been to assemble the evidence which relates to such concerns.

As originally conceived, the purpose of this study was to outline a future research project which would make statistical tests of the hypothesis that educational interests are in a better bargaining position when they are part of a general-purpose government. However, the study soon discovered that work done a decade ago, which then sought to test a nearly opposite hypothesis, probably pursued this statistical approach as far as is justified by available data. So this study shifted to the next stages of analysis: a broad review of available information and studies as they relate to concerns about consolidation of schools and general-purpose governments, and a look ahead to what additional research might be useful in understanding the possible future developments in the school-local government relationship.

CHAPTER 1

THE REASONS FOR LOOKING AT THE SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

The general objective of this project is to better understand the relative advantages of various changes which might be made in local government structure. Its specific effort, however, is directed at a much narrower objective: to assemble evidence which will illuminate the effect which a particular change, that of making schools a part of general-purpose local government, will have on education.

To provide background for the analysis of such evidence, this chapter discusses the general trends in local government reorganization which give reason for a closer look at the relationship between school and general-purpose local government. The subsequent chapters study the specific question as to how the educational system is affected by the relationship between schools and local governments. Chapter 2 summarizes the arguments for and against a close relationship between schools and local governments. Chapter 3 describes the ways in which this relationship may vary; in other words, it describes the variables in the structural relationship between schools and local governments. Chapter 4 examines the data which are available on each variable and on the influence of these variables upon the educational system. The final chapter, Chapter 5, explores some remaining questions regarding

the importance of the school-local government relationship to education, and suggests some directions for future research.

Two Conflicting Movements to Reform General Local Government

The nature of the school-local government relationship may be a particularly important question in new attempts to reform local government. For the past decade local governments in the United States have been involved in debates over two reform movements, one to consolidate and the other to decentralize local governments, which at least on the surface seem to be pressing in opposite directions. While both reforms have long been issues in local politics and administration, they have assumed their present form only in this century. School districts, as well as other local governments, have been targets of these two reform movements. Now, as these two reforms are brought together, the changes which might be made in schools could be of crucial importance to not only the schools but to the reform of general local government as well. Perhaps the school-local government relationship will decide both the new directions the reform movements of local government will take and whether these reforms will be effective in achieving the broad purposes of local government.

The movement for consolidation of local governments has focused upon the establishment of metropolitan area governments. In its present form it dates back at least half a century and is related to an earlier and successful effort to consolidate the rural school

districts which were too numerous and too small. The movement to decentralize city government, only a few decades old and less developed, also had early roots in the school systems, with its most publicized experiment being the limited decentralization of the New York City school administration.

These reforms have not taken the cities by storm, but neither have any others since the Second World War. In fact, the past decades can be summarized as a period (a) seeing much criticism of existing structuresof local government, (b) during which the most popular proposals have been those for consoldiation and decentralization, but (c) during which there has been relatively little reform, perhaps in part because these two most popular proposals have pressed in opposite directions.

Consolidation

The arguments for consoldiation have been made by most students and reformers of local government and heard in nearly every metropolitan area. Frustration has been the main cause for the consolidation proposals, especially frustration with the inability of local government to deal effectively with urban problems, such as transportation congestion, pollution, crime, and inadequate low-income housing. The blame has been placed on the fragmentation of local government, both geographical and functional.[1] How can traffic congestion be reduced

[1] For a sampling of such analyses see: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism, Report M-31 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966); Committee for Economic Development, Guiding Metropolitan Growth (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1960); Robert C. Wood, 1400 Governments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961); John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), particularly Chapters 6, 14, 15, and 16; and Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1970).

without careful coordination between highways and public transit, zoning and public parking, suburbs and downtown? How can a downstream water system be protected from an independent upstream water polluter, or how can air quality be provided on anything less than a regional scale? How can education be better related to job opportunities? How can crime be reduced when the parts of a metropolitan area depend upon police forces which do not coordinate dispatching, which waste effort by duplicating investigations, and which are blocked at arbitrary community boundaries when enforcing the law? These are problems throughout the United States. While they may not be the only problems in local government, and perhaps not even the most important, they have been the most visible and hence the most frequent targets of reform.

A second frustration giving rise to arguments for consolidation is the lack of public responsibility in present local government. When existing local governments are unable to meet public demands for a service, the solution often has been to create a new special-purpose unit of government. While these governments may be admirably effective in their special purposes, they aggravate the problems of coordination and of public control. Their narrow focus encourages narrow solutions, which in turn fail to accommodate the broad and complex needs of urban society. They are neither structured so as to be broadly gauged themselves, nor are they responsible to a broader unit of government which can coordinate their programs with other agencies. They also frequently lack public control, not being directly responsible to the public, but instead to relatively independent, self-

perpetuating, and little known boards. Even when the boards are elected, their narrow function and the large number of such special-purpose governments result in public apathy and confusion rather than effective public control. Hence the argument is strengthened for a consolidated government, directed by elected officials, accountable to the public.

Education usually has not been included among the functions to be consolidated under the proposed consolidation reforms. The probable reason is that to do so would substantially increase the opposition to consolidation, by adding opposition by many educators and other supporters of the existing school system. Since the reformers seldom win their battles for consolidation anyway, they are not anxious to increase the odds against their success. Besides, it can be argued, school districts create fewer problems of fragmentation than do other special-purpose governments because the public has a higher level of interest in and understanding of the school systems and therefore probably exercises more effective public control.

However, this argument cannot cover all the problems of fragmentation which relate to schools. For example, one of the heaviest burdens the schools have carried during the past decade has been the almost sole responsibility for racial integration. The schools have handled this responsibility without having control of such public tools as zoning and public housing, which could help achieve integration and yet which are often used to prevent it.

Decentralization

The pressures for decentralization are an additional, but different, result of the frustrations with the lack of governmental responsiveness.[1] If government doesn't listen to the people, the argument goes, cut it down to size, goegraphically, where the people can get at it. If government seems unable to prevent crime, give the neighborhoods control of the government and the local police: at least the neighborhoods can take care of problems in their own backyards.

Decentralization has come about in two primary ways. First, and most dramatically, it has come from demands by minorities, such as in the case of pressure (at best only partially successful)[2] to decentralize the New York City school system. Second, and more often (in several hundred cities),[3] it has come through neighborhood councils or city halls where citizen participation or city administration, but not formal legislative power, has been decentralized by the mayors of large central-

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1 See, for example, Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government, The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), and George Frederickson (ed.), Neighborhood Control in the 1970's (N.Y.: Chandler, 1973).

2 Marilyn Gittell, "Education: The Decentralization--Community Control Controversy," in Race and Politics in New York: Five Studies in Policy Making, ed. by Jewell Bellush and Stephen M. David (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971), pp. 134-161.

3 The International City Management Association identified 72 cities as early as 1970. See reports in Howard W. Hallman, "The Neighborhood as an Organizational Unit: A Historical Perspective," in Neighborhood Control in the 1970's, ed. by George Frederickson (N.Y.: Chandler, 1973), p. 14; George J. Washnis, Municipal Decentralization and Neighborhood Resources (N.Y.: Praeger, 1972), pp. 387-390; and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The New Grass Roots Government? (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

city governments looking for more effective communication links with the various and different neighborhoods. The pressures for decentralization may be increasing because of concentration of population in large urban regions. Also, decentralization is made easier by state and national financial aid and, more recently, by the Serrano case[1] and the philosophy behind it, which are prompting more even distribution of financial resources available to local governments.

Decentralization reflects the high value which U.S. political thought, at least in its abstract formulations, places upon local participation and control.[2] This emphasis has helped preserve the relative independence of U.S. local government and has facilitated attempts to decentralize urban government to a neighborhood level.[3] Howard Hallman presents the well-documented argument that the new decentralization movement is a revival of the idea of neighborhood organization which was fundamental to the urban political machine of the Nineteenth Century, was presumed by the settlement house movement of the turn of the century, was promoted by Clarence Perry and Clarence Stein of the city planning

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[1]The decision by the California Supreme Court which concluded that the local property tax resulted in too great a variance in financial resources to meet the state's constitutional requirement for equal protection. Serrano vs. Priest, 487 P2d 1241 (August 30, 1971). See also Rodriguez vs. San Antonio Independent School District, 93 U.S. 1278 (1973) in which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Constitution does not require a more equal distribution of financial resources.

[2]For a discussion of theoretical arguments for an actual experience with grass roots government see Henry J. Schmandt, "Decentralization: A Structural Imperative," in Neighborhood Control in the 1970's, ed. by George Frederickson (N.Y.: Chandler, 1973).

[3]See for example, Lewis Mumford, "Neighborhood and Neighborhood Unit," Town Planning Review (January, 1954).

movement early in this century, and went into only temporary eclipse as the efficiency movement and the New Deal advocated and supported centralization during the Thirties and Forties.[1] Never dead,[2] the neighborhood concept was given a new life in the Sixties by the Community Action and Model Cities programs.[3]

The recent pressure for neighborhood government has developed out of the demands by, or the concerns for, the poor and the minorities. Such government also should be useful to other economic and cultural groups, and to some extent already exists for the middle and upper class in the form of the suburbs which are politically independent. The value of these more local governments is evidenced by the unwillingness of their residents to accept consolidation in spite of the problems resulting from fragmented metropolitan government.[4]

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1 Howard W. Hallman, "The Neighborhood as an Organizational Unit: A Historical Perspective," in Neighborhood Control in the 1970's, Ed.by George Frederickson(N.Y.: Chandler, 1973).

2 The continuing interest of city planners, through the "eclipse" period, can be seen in Howard W. Hallman, "Citizens and Professionals Reconsider the Neighborhood," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXV (August, 1959), 121-127, and Herbert J. Gans, "The Balanced Community Homogeneity or Heterogeneity in Residential Areas?" Journal of the American Institute of Planners XXVII (May, 1961), 176-184.

3 A comprehensive overview of developments is given in Howard W. Hallman, "Neighborhood Power: A Ten Year Perspective," Neighborhood Decentralization (November-December, 1974).

4 A recent review of the reluctance of voters to support metropolitan government is made by Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press in Governing Urban America, 4th Edition (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1972), Chapter 10.

The New Synthesis

A new reform movement combining basic elements of both consolidation and decentralization has emerged in the last decade.[1] It provides two tiers of local government, both being different from the present governments. The upper tier is a metropolitan area government which may be responsible for such area-wide services as pollution control, water supply, and public transit. The lower tier is a system of sub-metropolitan, or "community," or "neighborhood," governments having various degrees of responsibility for such services as neighborhood recreation centers, police patrols and street lighting.

The synthesis is possible, in spite of the apparent contradiction between decentralization and consolidation, because the movements share the same basic purposes. Both hope to increase government responsiveness. Both seek more direct public control by reducing the number of governments and making these governments directly responsible to the public. Both also seek governments which will deal more effectively with public needs by consolidating responsibilities into general-purpose governments and one-stop neighborhood city halls.

While there are a number of approaches proposed for the two-tier system, they share some basic characteristics. The two-tier systems

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[1] See, for example, Thomas P. Murphy and Charles R. Warren, Organizing Public Services in Metropolitan America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974). Existing governments offered some precedent and experience for the two-tier approach. For a classification and description of such existing two-tier systems which offered various models for the new reform, see John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, Chapter 15, "The Two-Level Approach: Districts, Comprehensive Urban County Plan, and Federation," The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

result in more units of government than the earlier proposals for consolidation, but only a few more, and still far fewer than the number of cities, towns, and special districts now existing. In addition, they involve only two units with responsibility for any particular geographic area. The two-tier systems do replace the special purpose and politically-insulated governments with general purpose governments having publicly elected legislative and executive branches.

The two-tier system may have been proposed as a compromise to make metropolitan government acceptable,[1] but it does also promise a number of advantages of its own. First, it should provide greater effectiveness, because each unit has broad responsibility so that it can coordinate programs, and a broad grant of power, so that it can try new approaches to unsolved problems. It should end, or at least reduce the number of, special purpose governments which institutionalize narrowness of purpose and compound the difficulties of meeting the complex and changing problems of urban society. It should provide an area-wide unit of government for meeting problems which cross geographic as well as functional lines. The two tiers may not provide the effectiveness of a single metropolitan government, but they can come relatively close when compared with existing systems. Besides, the inefficiencies which might be caused by conflict and smaller scale operations in two levels might be more than made up for by the efficiency

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[1] Charles Warren suggests this was the motive behind the CED proposal. See Charles R. Warren, "Developing Alternative Models for Servicing Metropolitan America," in Organizing Public Services in Metropolitan America, ed. by Thomas P. Murphy and Charles R. Warren (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 3.

achieved by the flexibility and the on-the-spot understanding of the smaller community-level governments.

The second promise is for increased public control, especially for local control. The two-tier system provides not only representative elected officials, but also effective units of very local government, which are controlled locally and which are able to tailor programs to fit both local priorities and local circumstances.

Finally, the two-tier system offers the promise of an effective "areal" check in the system of governments.[1] There are two primary systems of checks and balances in the U.S. governments. The best known is the separation of power between executive, legislative, and judicial processes within a particular government. The other, and equally fundamental, check in the U.S. federal system is the areal division of power between levels of government which are responsible for various geographic areas. An example is the division of power between the national and the state governments. In both the separation of power and the areal division of power the founding fathers sought protection in a balance and tension which they hoped would prevent any governmental unit from amassing too much power, would give citizens, especially minorities, multiple points of access to government, and would increase the probability that conflicts would be fully and fairly aired in public debate.

The two tiers attempt to further these objectives by using a straightforward areal division to replace a confusion of fragmented

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[1] For an exposition of the theory of "areal" division of power see Arthur Maass (ed.), Area and Power, A Theory of Local Government (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959) particularly the first two chapters.

governments. The result would be four "areal levels": national, state, and the two independent (or partially independent[1]) and competing tiers of local government. Each tier would have a broad charge of responsibility and power so that they would compete, and hence would be real checks against each other and not isolated and unrelated fragments. Each would have, through public election of the policy-making board, a definite and simple mechanism for public responsibility.

There has been little opportunity to give the theory practical tests. Some Canadian experience has supported it, but most of that experience has been limited to partial uses of the two-tier system.[2] But there is a growing discussion of the approach. Discussants now include not just individual scholars and reformers, but such national

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[1] There exists a broad range of proposals and experience regarding the independence of the community level government. See Mario Fantini, and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization: Achieving Reform (New York: Praeger, 1973), especially "Appendix I," for some typologies of decentralization. Many writers, including Gittell, speak of local (or neighborhood or community) "control" to describe the independent situation. Gittell uses the term "decentralization" to describe the dependent situation, but this is confusing in that all the proposals involve decentralization. "Decentralized administration" might be more descriptive. The extent of independence is, of course, a crucial variable in the proposals, and an "areal division of power" requires independence. For a discussion of this variable and the promises and problems of citizen participation see Sherry R. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." Journal of the American Institute of Planners XXXV (July, 1969), 216-224.

[2] Harold Kaplan, Urban Political Systems, A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); and William K. Wilken, "Successful Centralizing Reorganizations," in Organizing Public Services in Metropolitan America, Thomas P. Murphy and Charles R. Warren (eds.),(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 53-56.

organizations as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the League of Women Voters.[1]

Two Key Problems

There may be two key problems in the two-tier approach. They are not unique, for they apply to other systems of government, nor are they the only problems with a two-tier system. But they are especially crucial and warrant extra attention when a two-tier system of local government is being considered or designed. The problems are (1) whether the community, or neighborhood, level of government will generate enough interest among its citizens to give it adequate strength, and (2) whether the community government will be too susceptible to control by factions which can ignore the interests of minorities within the communities.

Strength--The Critical Mass of Public Interest

In the long run, both the strength and the effectiveness of the community governments depend upon the interest, support, and participation of the local population. As the community-level government competes with higher levels of government, as it should and must if it is to

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[1] Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967); ACIR, "Neighborhood Subunits," Information Bulletin No. 71-3 (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1971); ACIR, The New Grass Roots Government? Report M-71 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); League of Women Voters, Supercity/Hometown, U.S.A. (New York: Praeger, 1974).

provide a meaningful check in the system of governments, it needs a strong citizen support which legitimizes its existence and strengthens its role. In other words, the grass-roots government must be strong enough that public leaders at all levels find it politic to respect the value and to recognize the interests of the community level governments. In addition, public interest, support, and participation are necessary for a second reason: to make the programs of the community-level government effective. They do this by improving the government's understanding of local needs and priorities, and by increasing the cooperation of the residents in implementing community programs.

These needs for local support require that the community government provide services which the local population finds significant enough to deserve their special attention: their afterwork hours, their neighborhood discussions, and their financial and political support. The community-level government then will realize the advantage of having special understanding of local values and circumstances. It also will be more likely to have the support at the polls and in the state legislators necessary for an effective bargaining position with the metropolitan-level government, a position which is essential if the community-level government is to have some real independence and act as an effective "areal" check in local government.

Because the public's interest in local government is frequently low, methods to increase it deserve serious attention. The community-level government can too easily be forgotten, in large part because most people are, as York Wilburn points out, reasonable satisfied:

> When surveyors of public opinion actually go from door to door, as has been done in some of the best-financed of metropolitan surveys, asking people what they consider to be crucial problems of metropolitan life, the answers have been surprising. Most people questioned were not particularly worried or unhappy about anything in their urban environment.[1]

Community-level governments with only limited powers and purposes will not help increase the level of public interest. The proposals for two-tier systems have had some difficulty outlining responsibilities for the neighborhood tier which seem sufficient to assure continuing public involvement, not just temporary involvement during periods of crisis. Howard Hallman, as an advocate of neighborhood government, can list a significant set of responsibilities, assuming a neighborhood population of 25,000. However, his list, shown on Table I, includes elementary and secondary education as well as other functions frequently performed by special-purpose districts. Taking only those responsibilities which most existing general purpose governments could decentralize, and considering the low level of interest the public generally shows for existing general purpose government, the list is not encouragingly long, broad, or important.[2] The lack of responsibilities important enough to generate such interest will not only reduce the power and effectiveness of the

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1 York Wilburn, The Withering Away of the City (Birmingham, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1964), p. 47.

2 For an evaluation of actual decentralization experience see Douglas Yates, Neighborhood Democracy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

TABLE 1

RESPONSIBILITIES OF NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENTS—POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL

	Hallman's classification:[1] Activities which can be handled by:			Functions performed by metropolitan and neighborhood governments in established and proposed two-tier systems:[2] Local = ☐ Shared = ▨ Areawide = ■ UR = Unreported								
	Neighborhood of 10,000	Neighborhood of 25,000	Only by Areawide Government	Jacksonville	Indianapolis	Atlanta	Miami	Cleveland	St. Louis	Toronto	Ontario	England
Police	Patrol Routine invest. Traffic	Same	Crime lab. Special invest. Training Communications	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	■	■	■	■
Fire	Fire Company (minimal	Fire Company (better	Communications Training Sepcial invest.	▨	▨	■	▨	▨	■	■	■	■
Transportation	Local streets Repairs Lighting	Same	Major arteries Mass transit Airport; port	■	■	■	■	▨	■	▨	▨	■
Refuse	Collection	Same	Disposal	■	■	▨	▨	▨	■	■	■	▨
Water & Sewer	Local mains	Same	Trunk lines Treatment plants	▨	■	■	▨	▨	■	▨	▨	▨
Parks & Recreation	Local parks Playgrounds	Same, but larger	Large parks, zoo, museum, golf, concert, stadium	■	■	■	■	▨	UR	▨	▨	▨
Welfare	Social services	Same	Assistance payments	■	■	▨	■	■	■	▨	■	▨
Health		Health center Public health service	Hospital	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	▨	▨
Air Pollution Control			Air Pollution control	UR	■	■	■	UR	UR	■	■	▨
Land Use Planning	Local planning Zoning Urban renewal	Same and code enforcement	Broad planning Building & housing standards	UR	■	■	▨	▨	■	▨	■	■
Housing	Public housing management	Same & Construction	Housing subsidy allocation	■	■	■	■	UR	UR	■	UR	▨
Libraries	Branch (small)	Branch (larger)	Central reference	■	■	UR	■	■	UR	▨	▨	▨
Education	Elementary	Secondary	Community coll.	Not reported—usually a separate government								

[1]Howard W. Hallman "Neighborhood Government in a Metroplitan Setting"(Sage Library of Social Research, No. 12) 1974, pp. 52-53 by permission of Publisher, Sage Publications, Inc.

[2]Thomas P. Murphy and Patricia Florestano, "Unimplemented Metropolitan Reorganizations," in Organizing Public Services in Metropolitan America, Thomas P. Murphy and Charles R. Warren, eds. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 72. Reprinted by permission of the Publisher, Lexington Books.

community governments, but also may induce these governments to expend disproportionate amounts of their resources on efforts to enhance powers or to even survive.[1]

Equity--To Avoid a Stable Majority

James Madison, in No. 10 of The Federalist, argued for a strong national government as a means of reducing the danger that democratic government will be controlled by factions. The problem of smaller governments, he said, is that:

> The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.

The problem was recently described in vivid fashion by a hypothetical case of five persons who use voting to decide their evening entertainment.[2] Three vote for a card game and two for a movie. If the same vote is taken night after night and the results are always the same, there is reason to question the fairness of the procedure. The two in the minority might have a chance if the majority faction disagreed as to what card game to play. Then the two could bargain

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[1] Henry J. Schmandt provides useful discussion of the failure to generate interest in poverty and model cities neighborhood organizations. See Henry J. Schmandt, "Decentralization: A Strucutral Imperative," in Neighborhood Control in the 1970's, ed. by George Frederickson (New York: Chandler, 1973), pp. 17-36.

[2] "City Government in the State Courts," Harvard Law Review, 78 (1965), 1956.

with one of the majority to support his choice of card games one evening in exchange for his support the next evening in going to a movie. The controlling faction, or "stable majority," is then divided and the minority faction has a means of bargaining for its interests.

The probability of a stable majority tends to be greater for smaller groups, for groups in which a majority share an economic and social culture and for situations in which there are fewer issues to decide. Fifteen men would have been less likely to have a majority of members who consistently agreed on the evening's activity. Five men, each from different cultural backgrounds, would be more likely to have three, four, or five preferences, and thus less likely to form a stable majority. The stable majority of the original five persons probably could be broken sooner if they also voted on their eating place, since the three card players might well disagree on this question and be willing to bargain to gain votes from the moviegoers.

Because of the tendency toward stable majorities in small governments, minorities frequently find a better hearing and more sympathetic response from the national government than from the state or local government. Now, however, a primary argument for the two-tier system has been to decentralize local government to the point that minorities have control of some community-level governments and thus are given some escape from control by the majority.

However, the community-level governments will have their own majorities and minorities and will be even more susceptible to the

problem of stable majorities. First, the community-level governments are smaller than most units of government. Second, although a diverse neighborhood may be theoretically desirable, and even sought be some, most urban residents want and find neighborhoods of relatively similar economic level and cultural background. Third, the issues before the community government will be narrower than those before the metropolitan, state and national governments. Finally, the problem is further aggravated if large numbers of the voters are relatively uninterested in the local government (whether because they are satisfied, or ignorant, or too busy) and are willing to leave the responsibility of government and for compromise to a few "leaders" of the majority. Thus it may be essential to broaden the responsibilities of the community-level government in order to reduce the probabilities and problems of stable majorities within the community-level government, as well as in order to strengthen that government in dealing with the majority which may control the metropolitan-level government.

The Importance of the School-Local Government Relationship

No function of local government generates such broad and intensive citizen interest as does the function of education. Nothing could do more to establish a broad range of issues and a higher level of public interest than could the inclusion of education among the responsibilities of the community government. This critical mass of interest could help meet the need for public support of the neighborhood-level government and to reduce the problems of stable majorities.

Tying the schools to the general-purpose local governments may offer additional advantages to the school systems themselves. Those who support greater educational expenditures may be in the minority and frequently lose if the only issue is the one which pits them against the rest of the community. But they are one of the largest constituent groups, and hence would be one of the most powerful minorities, with very considerable bargaining power, if they are in a government which combines the school issues with many other issues.[1] Similarly, the schools may find better means to handle such demands as busing for racial integration if they are part of a government which can promise, and make, effective use of zoning and other tools. The specific arguments for and against the integration of the school and local government are actually a microcosm of the basic problems raised in a consideration of the most appropriate and beneficial structure of all levels of government. The autonomous vs. integration issue for schools involves the same concerns of adequate citizen participation, possible dominance by a minority faction, and financing.

So whether for the purposes of a workable and equitable two-tier local government, or of improving the bargaining position of schools and giving them some protection from unreasonable expectations, there may be good reason to consider linking the schools to general-purpose governments. There may of course be dangers to the schools in doing so. In the past educators have feared that such linkage would adversely

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[1]This is argued by Julius Margolis in "Metropolitan Finance Problems: Territories, Functions and Growth," Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization, By National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 229-293, and argued later by Robert Salisbury in "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review, 37:3 (Summer, 1967), 408-424.

affect the schools. Some educators have thought that linking the schools to general-purpose local government would affect school input by decreasing available finances, forcing the school to compete with other community expenditures and then ultimately harming school output. Educators have been concerned that schools be able to garner ample resources and that they as professionals control school policy to ensure the wisest use of these funds in training their clientele. They see a change in the school-local government relationship as a possible detriment to the well-being of the schools. The following chapters look at just how real these dangers are. There is little probability of an immediate, large-scale, and purposeful shift in the school-local government relationship. But isolated experiments are more likely, and there are pressures to broaden the responsibilities of the schools which may lead to long-term and gradual shifts in the relationship. The following analysis is offered as guidance for any experimentation or attempts to guide such shifts.

CHAPTER 2

THE COMMON MODELS OF THE STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND GENERAL-PURPOSE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The "structural" relationships between schools and general-purpose local governments are the formal legal ties which are established by the state constitutions or the laws enacted by the state legislatures. They determine the formal power which the general-purpose local government has over the public schools. Where the ties are close, so that the local government has significant legal powers over the public schools, the school system is said to be dependent. Where the school system is relatively autonomous in terms of legal powers, it is said to be independent. At the present time there is in the United States a variety of structural relationships and a significant range in the independence of the school systems as described in Chart A.[1]

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[1]The formal relationship between the school and local government includes constitutional and statutory provisions for municipal or county review of the school budget, tax rate limitations, budget or expenditures limitations, the allocation of taxing powers, and the assignment and use of tax bases for both school and non-school purposes. While the school budget process is affected by both formal and informal patterns of communications between schools and local government, the term dependence usually refers to formal relationships between schools and local government regarding school expenditures. For a detailed discussion contrasting the formal and informal school-local government relationship as it affects the school budgetary process see H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966); and H. Thomas James, Alan Thomas, and Harold J. Dyck, Wealth, Expenditure and Decision-Making for Education, Cooperative Research Project No. 1241 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1963). The latter work includes the findings of their case study approach in fourteen of the 107 cities in the total sample and points out the importance of clearly defining the variables used to categorize the school-local government relationship. While numerous authors use the same terms of dependence/independence they are often not talking about the same type of school-local government relationship.

CHART A

RANGE OF STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS OF THE SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT WHICH LEAD TO A "MORE OR LESS" AUTONOMOUS SCHOOL DISTRICT

(1) Fiscal dependence;	(1) Fiscal independence;
(2) General voter eligibility in school bond referendums or school board elections;	(2) Property restrictions on those elections or school board elections;
(3) Holding school bond referendums at time of general election;	(3) Holding school bond referendums as a special election
(4) School board has discretion over the budget but power to increase taxes to meet fiscal needs resides in state legislature and school board must justify;	(4) School board has the authority to certify tax levy needed to raise money for budget
(5) Appointed school board;	(5) Elected school board;
(6) Partisan elections;	(6) Non-partisan elections;
(7) School board members elected by ward;	(7) School board members elected at large;
(8) Public vote;	(8) No public vote;
(9) Tax limit.	(9) No tax limit.

But most of the school systems are in actuality quite independent of local government. Many educators and political scientists view the structural relationship between school and local government as an important independent variable affecting a wide range of dependent variables including school finances, expenditures, the decision process, and even school policies. Some educators claim that a change in the relationship from independence to dependence will have an adverse affect on the financial condition of the schools, and many political scientists claim that integration of the schools within the local government structure will change the goals and policy decisions of the school system. The objective of this chapter is to outline the arguments used for and against integration of the schools with local government[1] and then to present information on the present school-local government relationship across the United States.

Autonomous vs. Integrated Schools

The arguments for and against integration of the schools represent two different philosophical points of view. The separation argument is based on the premise that educational policy is best determined by non-partisan specialists in the field. The integration argument is based on the premise that comprehensive government produces the "best"

[1]Some of the more recent works which discuss the claims include, Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, and Raphael O. Nystrand, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970); Henry M. Levin, "Effects of Expenditure Increases on Educational Resource Allocation and Effectiveness," in School Finances in Transition, ed. by John Pincus (Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1974); and Luvern L. Cunningham, Governing Schools: New Approaches to Old Issues (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1971).

policy.[1] These are illustrated in the issue of fiscal dependence vs. fiscal independence.

The terms "fiscal dependence" and "fiscal independence" refer to the degree of control that local government exercises over school budgets. In a fiscally independent school district the responsibility for the preparation and administration of the budget rests solely with the school board. In a fiscally dependent district a governmental agency other than the school board has the authority to control budgetary decisions. Those who favor fiscal independence for boards of education maintain that fiscal dependence may result in coercion in technical and professional matters. The controlling unit may let it be known that the school budget will be cut if the school does not adopt certain policies. Independence, they argue, avoids the diversion of school funds to non-school purposes and leads to greater stability and continuity in educational planning. They hold that public education is complex and important enough to have its policies and budget determined by a board which gives exclusive attention to those matters.

In opposition, those who believe that education should be fiscally dependent upon local government maintain that the determination of expen-

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[1]For a general review of the arguments for dependence and independence of the schools see, Robert F. Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," in The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1970), pp. 111-132; Robert H. Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review 37:3 (Summer, 1967), pp. 408-424; Henry M. Levin, ed., Community Control of Schools (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970); and H. Thomas James; Alan Thomas; and Harold J. Dyck, Wealth, Expenditure and Decision-Making for Education, Cooperative Research Project No. 1241 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1963).

ditures for all purposes, in proper relationship to one another, requires a single legislative authority. Several authors, including Anthony Downs, have argued that schools must compete with other segments for resources if the best product is to be ensured; in other words, competition produces consumer control. He states:

> To an economist, many of the criticisms recently made against big-city public school systems have a familiar ring: they are identical with the complaints that consumers have leveled against monopolies for centuries. Since big-city school boards, administrations, and teacher organizations are all essentially monoply organizations, this similarity of discontent is not coincidence.[1]

They also argue that divided control and responsibility lead to overlapping functions and duplication of effort. The advocates for fiscal dependence suggest that school superintendents and boards are often unaware of and unconcerned about the needs and fiscal problems of local government and of the total community. In addition, they point out that fiscal independence brings no positive assurance of freedom from politics.

Those dissatisfied with present policy decisions, expenditures, and programs of the schools frequently hold that the present isolation of the school system from general local government leads to decisions and to expenditures which merely reinforce old patterns.[2] They argue

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[1] Anthony Downs, "Competition and Community Schools," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry M. Levin (c 1970 by the Brookings Institution Washington, D. C.), p. 219.

[2] A review of these complaints may be found in Thomas L. Ribich, Education and Poverty (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968); Roald F. Campbell and Donald H. Layton, Policymaking for American Education (Chicago, Ill.: Midwest Administration Center, The University of Chicago, 1969); and Mario Fantini, "Participation, Decentralization, Community Control, and Quality Education," The Record, LXXI (September, 1969), 93-107.

that a change in school structure will result not merely in a shift of power from the educators to include the non-professional lay citizen, but will also strengthen the competition between the factions of taxpayers, school administrators, board of education, parents, and students. They believe that inclusion of the non-educational community will produce a basis of conflict which will eliminate the current monoply of power by the educators. They hold that this new competition, by allowing many the educational experience of participation, will produce educational policy which benefits all by improving educational outcomes that yield social benefits for the entire community. Such benefits will be an increase in the productivity of workers, an improvement in the functioning of a democratic society as a result of improved literacy, and an increase in technological advance and cultural attainment through the encouragement of human talent. These benefits, they hold, will come about as a result of the participation of many diverse groups in the decision process because "two heads are better than one."

The community clientele will be concerned not only with the academic achievement of the individual, but will also influence curriculum to include social aspects of community living. The community in turn will learn the participation process through their experiences in school policy formulation. Thus it becomes essential to alter the decision process to include the non-educational community. Henry Levin, for example, in addressing the question, "Can court-mandated edicts such as Serrano improve the distribution of educational opportunity?" does not suggest any specific form of structural change, but calls for a redistribution of decision-making authority. He states:

> Unless a redistribution of expenditures is accompanied by a substantial redistribution of decision-making authority, the educational outcomes and life chances of those who are ostensible "recipients" of higher expenditures will hardly be affected. In short, without massive changes in the political structure of our society, the decision has all the earmarks of a bold humanitarian gesture that will not produce the ultimate result that the court had in mind.[1]

Those supporting structural change argue further that even in terms of financial support the schools might be better off if tied to the general-purpose governments, that independent schools are more vulnerable to pressure groups such as those wanting to cut taxes, and are unable to form protective coalitions or to trade off one group against another in bargaining situations.[2] Besides, they argue, the separation results in inefficiencies, and hence less return for the money supplied the schools.

A key, but often unnoticed, difference between the two arguments lies in their areas of focus. For the educators who argue for autonomy of the schools, the emphasis is on the availability and management of funds. Their definition of a "good school" is one which has the

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1 Henry M. Levin, "Effects of Expenditure Increases on Educational Resource Allocation and Effectiveness," School Finance in Transition, ed. by John Pincus (Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1974), 177-198, 177.

2 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). For a review of the arguments against local government fragmentation see Raphael O. Nystrand and Luvern Cunningham, "Federal Urban School Systems: Compromising the Centralization-Decentralization Issue," Toward Improved Urban Education, ed. by Frank Lutz (Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones, 1970), p. 99. The authors focus on the fragmentation issue in a broad community services context. They state, "Governmental or jurisdictional boundaries in such a society are unnatural barriers which enhance spatial segregation and work against the functional interdependence that is essential to urban life." See also Thomas R. Dye and Brett Hawkins, "Metropolitan Fragmentation: A Research Note," Politics in the Metropolis, ed. by Thomas R. Dye and Brett Hawkins, Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp. 493-499.

necessary resources and emphasizes variables such as teacher-student ratio, the development of learning skills, teacher educational levels, or provision of remedial services.

Advocates of integration, on the other hand, focus on the policy formulation process and school policy rather than resource imputs. They believe that "good schools" give diverse groups a voice in the educational policy decisions and that participation in decisions is in itself a valuable learning experience.[1] This point is further clarified by two authors, Robert Lyke and Robert Salisbury.[2] Lyke, in his analysis of the community control issue, says that those who are calling for changes in structure which would produce community control of the schools are viewing the role of schools in a broader perspectiv than just teaching a child the three R's. This perspective, he states, believes that "decision making ought not to be judged solely by the policy it produces, but that certain procedures are desirable because they have significant side effects."[3] One such side effect is extensive citizen participation which may benefit both the community and the schools internally.

A review of Lyke's analysis of the administrative decentralization issue clarifies the contrast between the focal points of the educator and the political scientist even further. He holds that school personnel recognize the failure of the schools to meet the needs of the disadvantaged child but

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1 Robert F. Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," in The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan 1970), pp. 111-132.

2 Robert Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review 37:3 (Summer, 1967), 408-424.

3 Robert F. Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," in The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan 1970), p. 124.

that their solution and focus is much different from those advocating integration of the schools with local government. He says,

> Proponents of this view are the first to admit that ghetto education is poor, and they admit that some ghetto teachers are not doing their job properly. But the main problem, they feel, is not that there is too little contact with the community, but that ghetto schools are poorly financed and managed. If significantly more money were available, then better teachers could be hired, fewer children put in classes, and more auxiliary services provided.[1]

Salisbury broadens the question. Further arguing that dependence brings benefits, he claims that dependence results in closer coordination of community programs in meeting the needs of the poor, and that a separation of school and local government results in "feeble instruments for seeking public support" and a weak relationship between school spokesmen and state legislatures, thus making it difficult to obtain state aid. He sums up his case for dependence by describing the prevailing attitude of an independent school system as based upon the "myth of the unitary community," the fallacious belief of school administrators that education is a process that must not be differentiated according to different groups in the community. Salisbury claims that a school system which is a part of local government might better reflect the diverse needs of a community:

> In the urban center, there is no education which is separate from the issues of race, poverty, housing, crime and other human problems of the metropolis. The issue we need to face is whether greater mayoral control would lead to changes in school policy (e.g., better coordination and cooperation with urban renewal, recreation, and poverty programs) which would make the educational program more effective in solving the larger complex of community problems.[2]

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1 Robert F. Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan 1970), p. 124.

2 Robert Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review 37:3 (Summer 1967), 420. Copyright (c) 1967 by President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Although Salisbury does not verify his proposals empirically, he does point to the need for a re-examination of the arguments indicating the costs of "political control." At the same time, it should be noted that his tendency to discuss the question from a normative and hypothetical perspective makes empirical evaluation difficult. Salisbury has gone beyond quibbling over specific issues such as whether the independent schools should receive more financial support or state aid. He has broadened the question of the benefits of a dependent school system beyond that of the fiscal realm alone to include total community needs. He states:

> Direct competition for local money; subordination of educators to other public officials with other interests and programs; the self-conscious use of the schools as instruments to fight poverty, improve housing conditions, or fight city-suburb separation: these have been virtually unthinkable heresies to devoted schoolmen. Yet, are they much more than an explicit statement of steps and tendencies already being taken or implicit in present practices? I think not; we are already moving this way, to some extent we always have been doing so, and the real question to be faced is: How might we do these things better? A greater measure of local political leadership in education and coordination of the schools with other portions of the community might well contribute to this end.[1]

The advantages claimed for the integrated school system are quite broad. They encompass not only benefits for students but the general public as well. However, since the principle function of the school is to best serve its immediate clientele, students, recommended changes must be assessed first in terms of their effect on this function. Any attempt to change the relationship between schools and local governments

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[1]Robert Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review 37:3 (Summer, 1967), 424. Copyright (c) 1967 by President and Fellows of Harvard College.

must deal with the concerns of educators, even if the non-educational advantages of such change are substantial and certain. An evaluation of the disadvantages of the integrated school system begins with an assessment of the impact on school input. However, an assessment of the impact of the integration of schools with local government on school input must include an understanding of the inter-relationship of school input, the decision process, and school output. The importance of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the integraded school is underscored by an awareness of this linkage.

The Inter-Relationship Between School Input, the Decision Process and School Output

Schools and local governments are often evaluated according to the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness in producing desired output.[1] The schools' output is usually defined as academic achievement in terms of levels of learning skills, percentage of school population going on to and completing programs at institutions of higher learning, and drop-out rates. Output differs from policy. School policy is the more immediate end product of the decision-making process and includes decisions on areas of expenditures or the adoption of new curriculum programs. Traditionally, educators have sought to evaluate the schools according to output; i.e., student skills, rather than the policy process.

Emphasis on school output is also underlined by minority groups, middle class suburbanites, and academicians who look to the schools as

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[1]Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

agents of socialization, sources of change in attitude and as a preparation for an escape from poverty. Concern with output has come about because the public school system is seen to be closely linked with almost every aspect of urban life. Awareness of this connection has produced an interesting in isolating factors that influence school output. Financial resources have been viewed as a key variable since their availability determined important inputs, such as types of school facilities, percentage of qualified teachers hired, and size of personnel staff. Many have believed that the availability of money to the schools sets boundaries for the possible provisions of learning experiences.

Assuming that fiscal resources, as an input, affect school output, researchers began to examine the variables which influence the availability of resources. Investigation of this question led to the recognition that school output is affected not only by financial resources but also by other variables, including those which influence how schools choose to spend their money and who participates in such decisions. An analysis of the variables which effect school output must also consider the variables of both school input and the school policy process.

The Coleman study[1] underscores the need for analysis of the relationship of school input to output on a much broader basis than fiscal resources alone. Investigating the relationship of school services and resources to

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[1]The Coleman Report finds that home environment and interaction with students of other social class backgrounds are more important variables. James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).

student achievement, the survey reports that per-pupil expenditures, school physical facilities and teachers' years of training are not as significant as has been assumed. The findings of the Coleman survey, "that schools bring little influence to bear upon a child's achievement that is independent of his background and general social context..."[1] seem to suggest that financial resources are unimportant as determinants of student achievement and that schools do not have an influence on academic performance. However, further analysis produces findings that schools indeed do make a difference in student academic performance. Guthrie,[2] in a review of the major studies conducted on school services and academic performance, reports that he is "impressed with the amount and consistency of evidence supporting the effectiveness of school services in influencing the academic performance of pupils."[3] The question of the importance of fiscal resources then remains an open one. And the Coleman findings, rather than settle the issue of the importance of fiscal resources as determinants of school output only underscore further the need for additional investigation. We cannot assume that all school districts allocate their resources in identical

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[1]James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 325.

[2]J. W. Guthrie, "A Survey of School Effectiveness Studies," in Do Teachers Make a Difference? (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 25-54. In contrast to the Coleman findings, Guthrie reports that school services are effective influences on student academic performance.

[3]J. W. Guthrie, "A Survey of School Effectiveness Studies," in Do Teachers Make a Difference? (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 46.

patterns and thus differences in patterns of spending may be as important as the amount spent. The findings of the Coleman study call our attention to the need for analysis of the inter-relationship of school input, the decision process, and school output. They suggest, in contrast to the emphasis on school input alone, that the characteristics of the participants and the decisions regarding the allocation of resources may be equally as important to school output. And these are the concerns of many who are asking for more than just increased financial aid to schools. In contrast to the educators' concern for compensatory education programs designed to raise the achievement levels of the poor, there is a growing number of parents who are demanding a voice in the policy formulation process. Fantini describes this more encompassing demand clearly.

> . . .The events of a decade are bringing the affective aspect of education out of exile. For one thing, . . .the imbalance between the rich and the poor--programs aimed squarely at raising the grade-level achievement of the children of the poor--have failed. Some educators claim that compensatory education has not had a fair chance . . (but) it must be pointed out that ghetto parents no longer subscribe to this argument . . . They are calling for change in the system itself.[1]

Thus, the importance of factors which affect school input such as fiscal resources are being debated, and this debate underscores the importance of understanding the impact of the school-local government relationship on

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[1]Mario D. Fantini, "Community Control and Quality in Urban School Systems," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry Levin (c 1970 by Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.) p. 55. For a further review of this different emphasis see Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics," American Political Science Review, 52 (December, 1959), 1032-1051.

not only finances but also on the decision process as well.[1] A complete evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the integrated school system begins with an assessment of its impact on school input, but also includes an examination of the implications for the decision process.

The scope of the variables that influence both school input, the decision process, and output is quite broad, including not only structural variables but also numerous others, encompassing community socio-economic, attitudinal, and geographic variables.[2] An accurate, inclusive picture of the important variables covers a wide range. These numerous variables fall into three categories: (1) structural variables; (2) personnel characteristics; and (3) community characteristics. In the following chart these categories are outlined:

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[1]For a discussion of the difference between public policy as levels of public revenues and expenditures and policy as allocations see Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 1970), 508-522. These authors hold that public policy should be measured in terms of allocations rather than revenues. "The major hypothesis of our study is that in regard to the allocation of burdens and benefits of state government revenues and expenditures, political variables will have a stronger influence on policy outcomes than will socio-economic variables," p. 508.

[2]Luvern L. Cunningham, Governing Schools: New Approaches to Old Issues (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1971). Cunningham suggests that an appropriate classification of the different influences would have to account for these variables: (1) degree of discretion available to the local board; (2) financial support pattern; (3) geography: (4) index of population nucleation; (5) method of school board selection; (6) bureaucratization of the school organization: (7) socio-economic characteristics of the district's adult population: (8) measure of transiency among the adult population; (9) leadership style of the chief school officer; (10) decision-making behavior of the local school board; (11) posture of the mass media: (12) posture of the district's special interest groups toward education: (13) stance of religious groups toward the public schools.

CHART B

Variables which influence school inputs, school policy, and school Outputs.

I. Structural Variables of the School-Local Government Relationship
- Fiscal dependence vs. independence
- Appointed or elected school board
- School board representation—ward vs. at large
- Partisan vs. nonpartisan elections
- Presence or absence of tax limitation
- Presence or absence of a public vote
- Size of school district

II. Community Variables
- Size of city
- Educational attributes of adult population
- Geographic location
- Rural vs. urban population
- Community development history
- Wealth of community
- Sociological make-up of community
- Transience of adult population
- Public attitude toward education
- Type of mass media coverage of schools

III. Personnel Variables
- Race, age, occupation, sex and income of board members
- Background and personality attributes of superintendent and mayor
- Race, age, occupation, sex and income of city council members
- Philosophical outlook of board members

For the purpose of this analysis we are confining our analysis to the structural variables only. The importance of such an assessment is indicated by continuing controversy over the possible advantages of the integrated vs. the autonomous school for large numbers of students and communities.

The Historical Development of the School-Local Government Relationship[1]

The precedent for state responsibility for education, with local government directly in charge of operating the schools and providing financial support, was set in Massachusetts in the middle of the Seventeenth Century. The colonial legislature in 1642 resolved that it was the concern of the colony that the towns within the colony should see that children were instructed in the basics of reading and writing. The towns were to undertake the financial support of the schools. Town officials were charged with the responsibility of maintaining and establishing schools.

The New England pattern of the district system spread across the continent. However, there are exceptions such as Utah, Nevada, and many southern states, where the county is the geographic unit for the school districts. In the South, this different pattern of development came about because of the influence of the Church of England, as it assumed authority over education. Church officials and county officials served as the administrative agents of the Church of England as well as agents of the colonial government.

The early school-government relationship was an integrated one, with the citizens influencing school policy through the town meeting

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[1]For an overview of the development of the school district see Joseph Cronin, The Control of Urban Schools (New York: The Free Press, 1973); James D. Koerner, Who Controls American Education? (Boston: Beacon, 1968); and Edwin G. Dexter, A History of Education in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1922).

or through the town selectmen they elected. However, this type of town government often failed to meet the educational needs of the increasing population, particularly of rural residents, and so separate educational districts emerged to provide schools in the rural areas. Thus, the trend toward school-local government separation began. By the end of the Eighteenth Century, districts had been granted the power to conduct and finance their own schools, and school committees were being appointed to operate as governing bodies of the schools. These school committees were the forerunners of today's boards of education.

Early in the Nineteenth Century most city charters still made some provision for a school committee or a board of trustees for the supervision of the public schools. During the period 1800-1850 most city schools established some form of school board which was either appointed by the council or mayor or elected on a ward basis.[1]

Thus two main types of local educational systems grew under state tolerance: urban school systems with district boundaries coterminous with the corporate limits of the town or city and often existing as an arm of city government, and rural school systems with county boundaries and under the general supervision of an independent county

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[1]Between the years 1818 and 1853, 13 of the 14 city schools Cronin reviewed established some form of school board. Three of the boards included the mayor, eight of them were appointed by or included some of the city council and one board selected a superintendent. The members of 11 boards were first appointed by either the council or mayor. Two city school boards were chosen by the elected members of district boards. Salisbury suggests that a reaction to the machine era resulted in a separation of education and local government but at a much later date, during the early Twentieth Century.

superintendent of schools or a county board. An explanation of this development, with urban systems closely tied to local government as opposed to rural independent systems, is that urban schools originally operated under the control of the town while the rural schools were developed as a result of the inability of towns to meet the demands of rural residents. The control of the schools remained under municipal government while the rural school districts developed as a separate unit, a subdivision of the town. Dexter discusses this explanation in a review of the development of the school system in Massachusetts.

As each little settlement extended its boundaries, it became convenient for families, so far removed from the center of population as to make it difficult for them to send their children to the town school, to form a separate nucleus of education interests and establish a separate school.[1] State control of the schools was established, with an increasing trend toward the separation of local government and the schools through the increasing establishment of small school districts governed by independent school boards.[2] Early

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[1]Edwin G. Dexter, A History of Education in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1922), p. 183.

[2]Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, and Raphael O. Nystrand, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970), p. 107. Campbell presents a classification of school districts as follows: "Districts classed by geographical or area characteristics are usually treated as follows: (1) Community districts--those which are organized around 'natural' communities and labeled as such in the law. (2) City districts--those which are coterminous with city boundaries. (3) County Districts--the county can be designated as a basic unit of school government. (4) Towns or townships--hundreds of districts exist coterminous with towns or townships, particularly the township high school districts are good examples. (5) Common school districts--there are thousands of these found in twenty-seven states, and they include the remaining one-room rural schools. A large portion of the elementary districts described in the scope of program classification are also common school districts in many cases identified as common schools in the laws of the states."

in the Nineteenth Century school districts in Massachusetts were granted the power to raise money through taxation. By the end of the Nineteenth Century the school district had become a quasi-corporation exercising powers determined necessary to meet the state obligation to provide an educational system, under state rather than local government regulation. School district powers by the turn of the Twentieth Century included those of curriculum decisions, teacher certification, the raising and dispensing of fiscal resources, and establishing school building programs.

Basic Models of School-Local Government Relationships

Because the arrangement for public education was not arrived at through any basic continent-wide plan but is the result of a series of adjustments to varying circumstances and changing philosophies, the structural models that are used are extremely diverse. James, et al.,[1] in a study of school governmental arrangements, have outlined 32 combinations of variables and concluded that it is not yet certain to what extent these 32 models fit actual school government arrangement; but that "the available evidence suggests that most of these arrangements do exist." The major items of discussion in the school-local government relationship are: (1) who approves the budget and levies the taxes, (2) who selects the school board, (3) whether school board members are

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[1] H. Thomas James; Alan Thomas; and Harold J. Dyck, Wealth, Expenditure and Decision-Making for Education, Cooperative Research Project No. 1241 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1963).

elected at large or from subdistricts, (4) whether elections are partisan or nonpartisan, (5) whether there is a limit upon taxes which may be levied for school purposes, (6) whether a public vote can raise the tax limit, and (7) whether the boundaries of the local government and the school district are coterminous. A basic model of the school-local government relationship must include reference to these variables.

Of the total 46,177,840 students that were enrolled in the public schools in 1972, 8,705,838 attended schools that were fiscally dependent.[1] The breakdown of school districts into the categories of fiscal dependence vs. independence, therefore, is misleading because many of the fiscally dependent districts are located in large metropolitan cities with high levels of student enrollment. The number of fiscally independent school districts for the nation, listed as 21,782 as opposed to 1,608 fiscally dependent districts, gives one the impression that fiscal dependence in almost a rare type of structural arrangement. This is particularly true if one looks only at state school district figures. For example, New York has a total of 780 school districts, of which 746 are fiscally independent with only 34 fiscally dependent school districts. But student enrollment figures in New York draw a different picture, for 1,329,606 are enrolled in dependent school districts as compared to the 2,190,707 students enrolled in the independent district. Even though 90 percent of the school districts

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[1] U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. I: Governmental Organization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). Standard Education Almanac 1973/74, ed. by J.I. Reitman (New Jersey: Academic Media, 1973).

in the United States are classified as fiscally independent, approximately one-fifth of the nation's students attend schools that are fiscally dependent.

A review of the school district structural arrangement in each state (see maps, pp. 48-49) shows that there is a geographic pattern of arrangement or prevalent structural models.[1] From the information on school districts presented in Appendix A, it can be seen that in 30 states all the school districts are fiscally independent. As in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, all school districts are fiscally dependent. In the additional states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Tennessee, fiscal dependence is the predominant arrangement. In nine states, Arizona, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Kentucky, Texas, and Wisconsin there are both fiscally dependent school districts and fiscally independent school districts.

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[1] The figures for the number of school districts in the United Stated which are labeled fiscally dependent or independent vary according to the precise definition used. It is essential to note each specific definition of the terms used by each source. An example of this is the Standard Education Almanac 1973/74, ed. by J.I. Reitman (New Jersey: Academic Media 1973) which classifies California as having 1,069 districts that are fiscally dependent with no fiscally independent districts and only one district that is fiscally dependent/independent. This latter classification means that the district is independent for current expenditures but dependent for capital outlay and debt service. In contrast to this profile drawn of the California schools is the picture presented by H. Thomas James, Alan Thomas, and Harold J. Dyck, Wealth, Expenditure and Decision-Making for Education, Cooperative Research Project No. 1241 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1963). The authors state that in the Los Angeles City School District municipal officials play no part in the formal budget process. In a review of the literature or a comparison of the data collected on dependent vs. independent school districts it is important to be aware of fiscal categorization of school districts in the Appendix.

These figures contrast with the Bureau of the Census definitions used in this report (see Appendix A).



SOURCE: Standard Education Almanac 1973/1974, Ed. by J.I. Reitman (New Jersey: Academic Media, 1973).


PROPORTION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS ENROLLED IN FISCALLY DEPENDENT VS. FISCALLY INDEPENDENT BY STATE
FISCALLY DEPENDENT
FISCALLY INDEPENDENT
SOURCE: 1972 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS

An historical review of the development of the educational system leads one to expect a regional structural pattern which is substantiated in the geographic pattern of school-local government relationships. Charting the structural characteristics of the schools demonstrates that clusters of similar school-local government relationships do exist for some regions. The map (p. 48) does show that those states in Midwestern and Pacific Northwestern regions are predominantly characterized by the fiscally independent type of structure. Those states in the New England and industrial Northeast regions have fiscally dependent school districts. The Western regions of the United States are mixed with some states, such as Arizona and Texas, having a few fiscally dependent districts.

The geographical pattern of a second structural variable, the method of selecting school board members, is presented in a second map on page 49. Several sources[1] classify a majority, 60 percent, of the school board members as elected officials. This information is verified by a review of the geographic distribution of elected boards vs. appointed boards, although a minority of appointed school boards are found in the New England, the industrial Northeast, and Southern regions. Appointed

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[1]See Standard Education Almanac 1973/74, ed. by J. I. Reitman (New Jersey: Academic Media, 1973).

school boards are located in the twenty states of Alaska, Alabama, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

Within the wide range of structural variables two structural patterns are predominant. A sizable majority of the school districts across the United States are fiscally independent and are coupled with an elected school board and a public vote on a tax levy or approval on that part of the budget requiring a levy above the leeway tax limit.[1] Two additional variables which characterize the fiscally independent district are partisan vs. nonpartisan elections and the election of school board members on a ward vs. an at-large basis. An additional pattern of structural variables is formed by the districts that are fiscally dependent and characterized by: the appointment of school board members by either the mayor or the city council; the absence of a public vote on either the budget or a tax levy; and a specified legal restriction on the tax levy for school purposes. Specific analysis of the information regarding school district characteristics demonstrates that the two dominant models of the school-

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[1]U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. I: Governmental Organization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). Standard Education Almanac 1973/4, ed. by J. I. Reitman (New Jersey: Academic Media, 1973).

local government relationship are as follows:[1]

PREDOMINANT SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Fiscal Independence	Fiscal Dependence
Elected School Board Members (At-large school board representation)	Appointed School Board Members
(Nonpartisan school board elections)	
Public Vote (on tax levy)	No Public Vote (on tax levy)

[1]William S. Vincent, An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Statutory Controls on the Fiscal Responsibility of School Boards with Specific Reference to Fiscal Independence, Cooperative Research Project No. 3737 (New York: The City University Research Foundation, 1967). Vincent has gone further in describing the model characteristics by discussing the possible variations of these models and suggesting the philosophies behind them. According to Vincent, each structural arrangement reflects a different perspective of the proper amount of control that the government (state), rather than the local populace, should exercise over the schools. He holds that appointment of school boards, audit by a state agency, tax limits, and debt ceilings are intended to centralize the government's (state's) authority on education. The election of school board members, popular vote on the budget and election of the chief state school officers, are intended to permit a greater degree of local population influence in the schools. Fiscal dependence vs. independence is an additional option of state control. Vincent comments: "fiscal dependence or fiscal independence of the local (school) board derives from the pattern of state control by means of which the central authority circumscribes or qualifies the powers granted to the local agency, the school board, to carry out the state's responsibility for education" (p. 3). Vincent believes that fiscal dependence is a method used by state legislatures to exercise control over the local school boards. This is contrasted to the choice of options which permit greater local citizen participation, such as the public vote on the tax limit and the election of school board members. Vincent contends that the degree of state control over local school boards cannot be measured solely in terms of fiscal independence vs. dependence but must include the knowledge of whether the schools are required to operate under tax limit and whether there exists the option of the public vote to exceed the limit. Vincent views the public vote option as a way of freeing the board from the control of some other non-school governmental agency and yet keeping the power of the budgetary decisions at the local level.

These two models sketch the two predominant types of formal relationships that schools in the United States have with local government. The models present the basic alternatives of authority between schools and local government which concern educators and political scientists. Included in these two models are six variables which specifically characterize the structural relationship between schools and local government. These six variables, fiscal dependence vs. independence, appointed vs. elected school board, election at-large or by ward, partisan vs. nonpartisan election, tax limit vs. no tax limit, public vote vs. no public vote on tax levy, are defined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

AN OVERVIEW OF THE VARIABLES AFFECTING THE SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

An understanding of the relationship between schools and local government requires a knowledge of the variables involved, the ways in which they may be modified, and the implication of such modifications. Identification of the variables of structure will be the task of this chapter. The variables which characterize the structural relationship between school and local government are fiscal dependence vs. independence, appointed vs. elected school boards, ward vs. at-large school board representation, partisan vs. nonpartisan elections, tax limit vs. unlimited tax authority, and the requirement of a public vote on the budget or tax levy vs. the lack of such a requirement. Size of school district, although not a variable of the school-local government relationship, will be included for consideration because of its close association with the preceding structural variables.

The structural variables, which characterize the relationship of the school to local government, have been assumed to be related to school output indirectly through their influence on fiscal resources available to the schools.[1] The school-local government relationship has also been

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[1] See for example David W. Minar, "School, Community and Politics in Suburban Areas," in Education in Urban Society, ed. by B. J. Chandler, Lindley J. Stiles, and John T. Kitsuse (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1963). Marilyn Gittell, Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). Stephen K. Bailey, et al., Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962).

assumed to influence school policy with regard to how schools spend that money by determining who participates in the various policy decisions.[1]

Chart C on the following page suggests the connections between the school-local government relationship, school input, and the decision process. The interrelationship is quite complex, involving both school input, influenced by fiscal resources, and school output. By influencing who participates in the decision process, the local government relationship affects the decisions made in that process, and thus indirectly affects school policy, such as in curriculum decisions and expenditure patterns. The unraveling of this complex interrelationship begins with an understanding of the specific variables of the school-local government relationship. The definition and the theoretical importance of each specific structural variable are given in the following pages.

(1) Fiscal Dependence vs. Fiscal Independence

An outline of the governing arrangement of the school includes an understanding of educational financing. The standard variables involved in budget approval are: (1) Fiscal Independence--an arrangement under which the local school board is not required to submit its budget for the approval of any other governmental agency; and (2) Fiscal Dependence--an arrangement under which the local school board is approved by some non-school local

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[1]Ziegler's article reviews some of the problems the schools are facing, predicts a closer arrangement between the school systems and administrative departments of the city government and suggests some important new roles for the school in meeting community needs. Jerome M. Ziegler, "Should the Mayors Run the Schools?" City (Winter, 1972), 45-49.

CHART C

A flow chart of the interrelationship of the factors of: (1) the school-local government relationship, (2) availability of fiscal resources, (3) school input, and (4) school output.



governmental agency, or a non-local agency.[1] Empirically, these formal definitions have generally been used by those exploring the role of the fiscal variable despite the possible variations in degree of autonomy within each category.

The figures for the proportion of fiscally dependent or independent districts vary somewhat throughout the literature, depending on the specific definition used at the time of the analysis. Historically, the number of dependent school districts has decreased. In 1924 McGaughy found that in 21.3 percent of all cities having a population of 30,000 or over, the school budget was approved either by the school board or the electorate. In the remaining school districts the school budget was approved by either another local agency or a special county agency.[2] However, by 1967, the percentage of dependent districts vs. independent districts had completely reversed, with three-fourths of the nation's city

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[1]The definition of fiscal independence and dependence varies throughout the literature. Some authors hold that all schools are in actuality independent, and that budget approval methods are insignificant indicators of the school-local government relationship. H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: Stanford University School of Education, 1966), as well as William S. Vincent, An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Statutory Controls on the Fiscal Responsibility of School Boards With Specific Reference to Fiscal Independence, Cooperative Research Project No. 3737 (New York: The City University Research Foundation, 1967), allude to the difficulty of a clear definition. See also Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics," The American Political Science Review, 53 (December, 1959); Marilyn Gittell and T. Edward Hollander, Six Urban School Districts (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

[2]J. R. McGaughy, The Fiscal Administration of City School Systems (New York: Macmillan, 1924), and H. B. Woodward, "The Effects of Fiscal Control on Current School Expenditures," Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1948. Cited in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization. A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

school districts classified as fiscally independent and the remaining quarter categorized as fiscally dependent. Explanations often offered for this shift to the separation of school and local government, include the reaction of the public during the 1900-1930 period. against associating education with the "muck and mire" of practical politics. Campbell submits this explanation and describes this type of public attitude:

> Corruption, graft, and cynicism are assumed to be trademarks of politics at all levels, and while they may not be tolerable to people in some arenas of public concern, they are not acceptable when attached to the shaping and training of the immature minds of the public's progeny. For this reason school districts in the majority of cases enjoy considerable autonomy with respect to the management and control of their fiscal affairs and in retaining nonpartisanship in the selection of citizens to serve on local school boards.[1]

Theoretically, the importance of fiscal dependence/independence has centered on the issues of school fiscal support and keeping politics out of the schools. Educators have argued that financial independence keeps the school from becoming a political football of partisan politics and guarantees a source of financing that does not have to compete with local government's fund raising. Others argue that schools are inevitably political and that integration would only increase the competition for political power in the schools. This debate over the advantages and disadvantages of fiscal dependence vs. independence has raised several questions which numerous researchers have investigated. First, what is

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[1]Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, and Raphael O. Nystrand, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970), p. 87. The author adds as a side note, ". . .and it is obvious that this separation has been perpetuated and reinforced by the professional educators."

the significance of dependence vs. independence as an independent variable affecting school input? Second, does fiscal dependence vs. independence measure the political relationship of the school to local government? Third, do the categories of fiscal dependence vs. independence even measure the actual fiscal relationship between schools and local government? Since those who oppose the integration of schools fear financial repercussions, it is important to answer the first question in order to know if these fears are justified. It will be reviewed in detail in the next chapter. The second question reminds us that the school-local government relationship encompasses more than just a fiscal relationship and includes the relationship between school administrators and local government officials in terms of building programs of curriculum decisions such as adult education offerings. The data indicate that the words dependence and independence are not one-dimensional and that the school dependence may be fiscal, political or administrative.

The third issue, the accuracy of the terms fiscal dependence and independence as correct measures of the actual degree of local government fiscal control over schools, is quite debatable. Some schools are legally required to submit the budget for approval to a local government agency, but this is often only a formality so that those labeled as fiscally dependent are in reality fiscally independent. The fiscal relationship is often determined by factors other than just legal guidelines. James, et al., point this out in their analysis of the school budgetary process of fourteen large cities:

> We can see from this variety of governmental arrangements how difficult it is to dichotomize all such relationships simply

> as fiscal independence or dependence. The real world is more complex. The term "fiscal dependence" is not accurate as a description of a specific set of governmental arrangements. Nevertheless, the great debate over this misleading dichotomy persists.[1]

Their examination of the school budgetary process in several large cities indicated the difficulty of classifying the relationship as either fiscally dependent or fiscally independent. Chicago is an illustration of this problem. The school board's final budget is forwarded to the city council, but the city council may not make any changes in the budgetary figures and is required by state law to set a property tax sufficient to produce the needed school revenues, although this tax rate cannot exceed the maximum rate established by the state legislature. In actuality the state legislature, rather than the city council or the school board, determines the property tax levies for the Chicago schools.[2]

Several major studies have investigated the significance of fiscal dependence vs. independence and evaluated the accuracy of these categories

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[1] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 82. Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, and Raphael O. Nystrand, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970), p. 87, comments, "But independent of the formal relationships there exists an intensive set of informal liaisons among units of local government irrespective of the special purposes for which they were created and designed."

[2] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford, Calif.: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), discusses both the Chicago situation and that of San Francisco. The school fiscal arrangements in the city of San Francisco involve a formal fiscally independent structure wherein the school budget cannot be reduced by city officials and yet in which the Board of Education takes into consideration the general attitude of those in local government when preparing the school budget.

as measures of the school-local government relationship. The data from these studies and their conclusions are reviewed in Chapter 4.

(2) The School Board Variable: Appointed vs. Elected Boards, Ward vs. At-Large Representation, and Partisan vs. Nonpartisan Elections

A second major component of structure that must be considered in developing a model of school-local government relations is the process of selecting school board members and the structure of school board representation. The important variables connected with the school board structure are: elected or appointed board members, election at-large or by ward, and partisan or nonpartisan elections.[1]

The arguments for both appointed and elected boards rest, in large part, on the question of how to represent diverse community interests. Those in favor of an elected school board claim that the elected member is more likely to be accountable to the constituency and to reflect its preferences. Those favoring the appointed school board claim that appointment is the only way to insure minority representation. They believe that appointment frees the board member to make the "best" decision rather than the most expedient decision. The argument is made that the appointed board represents and is better tied to the broader public interest rather than the narrower single constituency interest.

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[1]Alpheus L. White, Local School Boards: Organization and Practices (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). The author found that in districts enrolling 1,200 or more pupils, nearly 86 percent of the board members were elected. The percentage of appointed board members in districts enrolling more than 25,000 pupils was higher. One in four boards in these larger districts was found to be appointed.

As is the variable of fiscal dependence vs. independence, the variable of elected vs. appointed school board is associated with both environmental variables and other structural variables. There are significant differences in the social characteristics of cities with appointed and elected school boards. The large majority of school boards are elected rather than appointed.[1] Appointed school boards tend to be located in large cities, having populations which rank low on general socio-economic scales. Dye, in his research on the school structure in 67 cities, notes that appointed school boards are found in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Birmingham, Jackson, Richmond, Norfolk, Buffalo, San Francisco, Seattle and Fort Wayne, and that the populations of these thirteen cities generally have lower adult education levels, lower family incomes, and lower proportions of white collar residents, than cities with elected school boards.

There is also a geographic pattern associated with appointed and elected boards. Over 90 percent of the school districts in the Northwestern, North Central and Western states have elected boards, while only 61 percent of the districts in the South have elected school board members. Method of school board selection is also associated with the

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[1]Of the structural variables examined by Dye in 67 large central cities, 54 school boards were elected while only 13 were appointed. Dye notes that "this parallels the results of more comprehensive surveys of city school districts which show less than a quarter of the nation's city school boards are appointed. Fifteen of the 67 cities in the Dye sample are fiscally dependent. These fiscally dependent cities tend to have larger populations than the fiscally independent cities in the sample and to have populations with lower levels of education, occupation and income. Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380.

structural variables of fiscal dependence/independence and size of school district. Appointment of school board members is more typical of fiscally dependent districts and the proportion of elected school boards varies with the size of the district, with the smaller districts having a smaller proportion of appointed boards than do the larger districts.

As with the distinction between the variables of fiscal dependence and independence, details of the appointment approval process must be taken into account as well as the elected/appointed distinction. In some school districts the mayor alone makes the school board appointments, while in others the mayor must gain the approval of the city council.[1]

A second type of school board variable is the basis of representation: whether school board members are elected by wards or at large. As the variable of election vs. appointed school board members, ward vs. at-large selection of school board members involves the issue of accountability. Does ward representation lead to more responsible school board members? Are school board members who represent smaller constituencies under greater pressure to meet the needs of their constituencies? Are trade-offs or compromises more difficult when fewer diverse needs are involved? It seems likely that ward representation, which ties the board member to a specific segment of the population, might lead to greater pressure, due to the increased possibility of face to face contact with interested parties, than would selecting school board members at large. A large majority of

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[1] Some variations involve special legislative action which requires mayors to select board members from a list of names presented to them by a special committee on school board nominations. Chicago is an example of this type of variation.

school boards are selected at large with very few being selected on the ward basis. In the 67 cities examined by Dye only eight selected school board members by ward,[1] and Dye notes that this ratio of ward vs. at-large representation corresponds to the nationwide ratio.[2] Unlike the variables of independence vs. dependence and appointed vs. elected school boards, the school board representation variable is not related to specific environmental variables.

A third type of school board variable is the partisan vs. nonpartisan school board elections. A majority, over two-thirds of the cities in the United States, utilize nonpartisan elections for school boards. Like the variables of ward vs. at-large selection, the variable of partisan/nonpartisan school board elections is not associated with environmental variables or the social characteristics of cities. Empirical analysis of the characteristics of cities which hold nonpartisan elections indicates that there is only a minor tendency for large cities with lower socio-economic populations to conduct partisan elections.[3]

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[1]The eight cities in the Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380, analysis which have school boards selected on a ward basis are: Greenville; Salt Lake City; Dallas; Los Angeles; Springfield, Massachusetts; Minneapolis; Providence and Atlanta.

[2]Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380, does not indicate his exact source for this comparison, but his principle sources of data were: U.S. Bureau of Census, County and City Data Book, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962): Research Divisions—National Education Association, Selected Statistics on Local School Systems 1963-64 (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1966).

[3]Charles E. Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Non-Partisan Elections in Large Cities," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (November, 1962), 345-363. Gilbert claims that the difference between partisan and nonpartisan are often "sharper in form than in fact since some nominally nonpartisan cities are effectively partisan. . .," p. 345.

The theoretical importance of this variable centers on the benefits of formal political connections. Educators claim that schools fare better when they are removed from the political struggles over city expenditures. Political scientists counter by claiming that schools, like any other sector of governmental services demanding a share of community resources, need the expertise, contacts and leverage of skilled politicians to obtain the needed resources. They believe that political ties with the major political parties will give the schools more clout in state legislatures. Thus the argument continues over the relative advantages of the autonomous and integrated school systems.

Thus the school board selection process consists of three variables: an appointed or elected member, representation of either ward or district at large, and a board member elected in partisan or nonpartisan elections. The typical school board member is usually a member of an elected board that has three to seven members. He serves for three, four, or six years, is elected popularly in nonpartisan elections, and most likely represents the district at large rather than a geographical subdivision of the district.

(3) Tax Limit vs. Unlimited Tax Authority

Tax limitations exist when the tax levy, in terms of a dollar amount, millage, or percentage of the assessed value of property, is limited by law. The governmental arrangements by which current and capital outlay funds can be made available to school districts also impose controls upon the schools. Control resides in the number of decision points required and in the prescriptions surrounding each decision in the budgetary process. The degree of freedom ranges along a continuum which can be divided into four

basic segments:

1. The school board is fiscally independent and has the freedom to determine the school budget and to certify the tax levy needed to raise the money required;[1]

2. The school board is fiscally independent but the levying of taxes above the established tax limit requires the approval of the voters of the school district;

3. The school board is fiscally independent but to levy taxes above the established tax limit the school board must present budget justification to some city, county, or state agency;

4. The school board is fiscally dependent and the levying of taxes resides exclusively with agencies other than the school board.

Many of those now conducting research on the school-local government relationship view the different combinations of variables as a continuum rather than distinct categories. They hold that most school districts are more or less dependent on other levels of government, on the nature of decisions stipulated by those levels of government and on the multiplicity of decision points. Tax limits tend to be associated with fiscally dependent districts and it is the larger school districts which are subject to the control of the tax limit. Legislators appear to be willing to allow the school boards greater discretion in the smaller districts.

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[1]Information on the range of freedom of each individual state can be found in the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. 1: Governmental Organization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). South Carolina is cited by Roald Campbell, et al., as an example of this type of freedom. The census reports that in some counties fiscal needs are determined solely by the local school boards while in others tax rates are established by law.

The possible hazards of the tax limit are two. First, an independent district may become functionally dependent because it must rely on another agency's approval for a necessary increase in the tax limit. Second, tax limits may be very difficult to raise and thus the school system may be forced to reduce expenditures or operate under a budgetary strain. It may be that school boards are reluctant to request additional funds when forced to obtain the approval of other agencies. A tax limit would then keep school expenditures down and cause the school to operate under an inadequate financial budget. Vincent summarizes these potential disadvantages of the tax limit:

> In a period of rising costs the results of this policy can be disastrous. The board may be reluctant to make the request, either to officers of general government or the people, whichever the case may be, except in terms of extreme need. Thus it is likely that under the tax-limit arrangement, regardless of the method of overriding the limit, channels of communication to the ultimate authority over revenues are not regular and tend to occur only in periods of crisis.[1]

(4) Formal Electoral Participation: Public Vote on Budget or Tax Levy vs. the Lack of Such a Requirement

A fourth variable of the school-local government structure is electoral participation. The debate over the impact of citizen participation in the schools in terms of voting on bonds, raising tax limits, and participating directly in the decision process questions the premise of the theory of democratic government. Those who would protect the schools

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[1]William S. Vincent, An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Statutory Controls on the Fiscal Responsibility of School Boards With Specific Reference to Fiscal Independence, Cooperative Research Project No. 3737 (New York: The City University Research Foundation, 1967), p. 71.

from citizen judgement and influence argue that the professionals should be left alone to make decisions in their specialized areas of expertise. Those who argue for increased citizen participation in the schools claim that the schools, or any area of public policy, should be molded by citizens rather than professionals. The concrete question which arises out of this debate is whether citizen participation limits expenditures. The more difficult question is whether citizen participation influences school policy.

Citizen participation has been measured in terms of two variables: the public vote, and the formal acknowledgement of, or provision for, a parental advisory group in the educational policy-making process. The public vote variable, more easily measured and defined, has been systematically and empirically analyzed. Citizen involvement in the policy process has been examined in a very limited fashion.

The public vote variable is the annual exercise of a vote by the eligible electorate of a school district on the entire budget or tax levy, or that part of the budget requiring a levy above a legal tax limit. Previous research indicates that the presence or absence of a public vote is related to size of school district and fiscal dependence/independence and that the public vote is more likely to occur in the fiscally independent districts with elected school boards. A wide range exists among the states regarding voting procedures for additional taxes for operating purposes. There are some situations in which no legal provision is made for such referendums. These circumstances exist in Maryland and Minnesota. In other states, such as New York, Oregon and South Carolina, there are no legislative limits to restrict local school district elections in expressing their preference.

Yet most states do have legislative limits beyond which taxes may not go, even with the consent of the electorate of the district.

A second aspect of electoral participation in the educational decision-making process is the advisory role of community or parental groups in an advisory capacity. Formal provisions have been made by some school boards to include parents directly in the decision-making process. This action initially came in response to federal categorical programs which have required parental involvement as a necessary condition for obtaining federal aid. One such federal action has been the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,[1] which required the local schools to establish parental advisory councils. In response to this request local schools throughout the U.S. established school-community advisory councils or "Parental Involvement Committees."

The difficulty of categorizing avenues of electoral or parental involvement is obvious. Experimentation with various types of involvement has been extensive. Involvement has included parents as paid employees, as advisors, and as decision-makers. Examples of experimentation include those districts supported by the Ford Foundation in New York City (e.g. Ocean Hill-Brownsville), which led to the development of the community action agencies in an attempt to stimulate citizen participation in the schools. Other examples are those where sub-district governing boards within the school system have beer established, such as in the Detroit city school system, or the Parent Involvement Committee in Atlanta, Georgia, which comprises parents, PTA representatives and school

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[1]Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act contained the provision that, "the priority needs of educationally deprived children were to be determined in consultation with teachers and parents."

administrators. Two other examples of structural modification include the Chicago Woodlawn Experimental District, which provides parents with an opportunity to participate in planning school development, and the Huntsville, Alabama, formation of the Association of Huntsville Area Companies, concerned with citywide programs involving citizens directly in the curriculum development.[1]

These examples illustrate the variety of ways in which citizens can be involved in school affairs.[2] They differ in their purpose, scope, and persons involved. To accurately describe and understand the structural modifications of the school policy-making powers in response to the demands for community involvement is difficult but it may be fruitful to categorize citizen participation by objectives. Burke[3] outlines the objectives of citizen participation: to increase understanding and support for the schools, provide instruction for the participants, co-op potential opponents of the institution sponsoring the participation, provide advice and counseling as to the goals of the program, increase the human resources available to carry out educational programs, and to influence the performance of the institution. There is an apparent need for additional

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[1]For a discussion of the Woodlawn Organization see Charles L. Sibberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), Luvern L. Cunningham and Raphael O. Nystrand, Citizen Participation in School Affairs (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Coalition, 1969), Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform (New York: Atherton, 1967).

[2]Some of the variations are discussed in Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury and Thomas H. Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), Laurence Iannaconne, Politics in Education (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education, 1967), and Michael D. Usdan, "The Role and Future of State Educational Coalitions," Educational Administration Quarterly, IV (Spring, 1969), 26-42.

[3]Edmund M. Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies," Journal of American Institute of Planners, XXXIV (September, 1968), 287-294. The author discusses these five strategies as educational therapy, behavioral change, staff supplement, cooptation, and community power.

research to investigate the relationships of school policy decisions to the types of citizen activity and avenues of involvement provided by the schools or other governmental agencies. Such information would grant additional insight into the implications of citizen participation.

An evaluation of the benefits of citizen participation logically begins with an analysis of the impact of the participation on school input and then proceeds to an analysis of its effect on the allocation of resources. This research design answers first the more concrete concern of the educator. It then progresses to an analysis of the data relating citizen participation to the decision process and school output.

(5) Size of School District

Size is a structural variable of the school system; it is not a variable of the school-government relationship. It is included here for consideration for three reasons. First, a change in the relationship between schools and local government may well require a change in size of school districts. A decision to integrate the schools with local government may lead to a merger of several existing school districts. For example, a city with numerous independent school districts may decide to integrate schools with the local government. This may result in a consolidation of school districts, with a consequent increase in size.

Second, school district size is closely associated with the variables of fiscal dependence vs. independence, elected vs. appointed school boards and public vote vs. no public vote. Some of the very large school districts are fiscally dependent in urban areas, which means that the size of the city may also be an influential factor. Legislators seem to be reluctant

to grant fiscal independence to school districts in larger cities. This may be a function of the historical distrust of rural legislators for urban areas. Vincent comments on this association between fiscal dependence and size of school district and claims that the size variable must be included:

> They [legislatures] appear more reluctant to allow comparable exercise of local discretion over fiscal decisions affecting education in the larger cities. Reasons for this are historical, partisan, and partly distrust of cities among rurally controlled legislatures. It would appear that there is no empirical reason to account for this situation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind that an analysis of the fiscal dependence/independence variable must include size as one of the factors in the complex of influences upon school district fiscal performance.[1]

Third, size may be related to the number of community demands made on schools. A persistent question throughout the literature on schools is "How large should schools be in terms of pupil enrollment, or how does size contribute to or detract from quality or economy of operation?" Not only does the question of size arise in regard to efficiency, but it also becomes a variable of possible importance affecting the type and number of demands made on decision-makers in the educational process and thus affecting their power and vulnerability.

The school-local government relationship is postulated as an important factor in influencing school policy because it either facilitates or hinders the expression of preferences by public and private groups.

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[1]William S. Vincent, An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Statutory Controls in the Fiscal Responsibility of School Boards With Specific Reference to Fiscal Independence, Cooperative Research Project No. 3737 (New York: City University Research Foundation, 1967), pp. 15-16.

Size of school district may also affect the number and fluency of demands communicated. As size of school enrollment increases, does the number of pressure groups and interested clientele also increase? As size increases does the board of education have a more difficult time balancing conflicting pressures, or does an increase in number of interested actions allow those directly involved in the educational decision-making process a greater degree of flexibility because they then are able to make trade-offs or bargains?

Those arguing for integration of the schools with local government hold that the autonomy of the schools leads to insulation and unresponsiveness to important groups in the community. They also fear that autonomous schools may be easily exposed to the demands of special interest groups, such as organized teachers demanding higher salaries and more encompassing benefit programs. Their speculations are based in part on school district size, for size is related to the potential number of demands made on decision-makers.

These variables of fiscal dependence vs. independence, appointed vs. elected school board, school board representation—ward vs. at-large, partisan vs. nonpartisan elections, tax limitation vs. unlimited tax authority and the presence or absence of a public vote, together characterize the school-local government relationship. We focus on the structural variables because an unraveling of the question of the impact of formal variables or "political variables" on policy decisions seems to begin here. Both political scienctists and educators claim that structure is an important variable. In addition, some educators claim

that integration of the schools with local government will be financially harmful. Empirical analysis answers both of these claims.

CHAPTER 4

DOES STRUCTURE AFFECT RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO EDUCATION?

A careful review of the empirical analysis done on the relationship between the school-local governmental arrangement on the one hand and school input on the other may help to distinguish between the merits and demerits of the integrated and autonomous school systems; to determine which arguments are groundless, which are correct, and further research needs. This task can be divided into two parts: first, an assessment of the influence of the single variables of structure, and second, an assessment of how these influences change as several of these variables are changed and interact with each other.

These variables have been analyzed both individually and as a cluster. Individually, the variables of fiscal dependence vs. independence, selection and basis of representation of the school board, tax limitation, public vote, and size variables, have been examined as they relate to a large number of dependent variables, including: level of expenditures per ADA, amount or success in obtaining state aid, proportion of local revenues going to the schools, teacher salaries, class size, clerical assistance, school tax rates, number of counselors, expenditures for library and audio-visual aids, teacher turnover rate, percentage of teachers with college degrees or graduate degrees, dropout rate and level of private school enrollment.

The literature dealing with the variations in the school-local government relationship provides a substantial examination of structural variables and suggests that conclusions can be drawn regarding the significance of these variables. These empirical studies indicate that: (1) there are no statistically significant differences between the resources available to the integrated school district and those available to the autonomous one; and (2) urban environmental variables, including size of city, level of adult education, wealth of community, level of adult occupation, and racial composition of city population, are far more influential in determining school input than are the structural variables.

The empirical analysis of the importance of the structural variables of the school-local government relationship has demonstrated that we cannot make a blanket claim that autonomous schools necessarily enjoy greater financial support,[1] or that independent school systems produce "better" schools in terms of facilities, teacher-pupil ratios, dropout rates, and teacher salaries. Nor can we confidently generalize that bringing the school system under the wing of local government will better equip the schools to bargain politically for a greater portion of local revenues. We cannot assume that the dependent school with a school board elected through partisan politics results in higher pupil expenditures, a tax

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[1] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966). James finds that superintendents and school boards in fiscally dependent districts tend to be more liberal in requesting budget increases. But, of course, requests and expenditures are two different things.

break for the taxpayer, or protection of the school board from the demands of teachers for higher salaries. Empirical evidence shows that within the present range of structural arrangements, variations in structure do not have a consistent impact on educational input and that we cannot make simple assumptions which link structural arrangements and school output. The accumulated information on the significance of each structural variable as it influences school input follows.

Fiscal Dependence vs. Independence

The results of empirical analysis examining fiscal dependence vs. independence as independent variables affecting school input indicates the following: (1) fiscal dependence vs. independence alone is relatively insignificant as an influential variable on school expenditures; (2) fiscal dependence vs. independence alone does not necessarily lead to higher or lower per pupil expenditures, for fiscal dependence vs. independence does not have consistent impact on the level of political or community support as measured by the level of school fiscal expenditures; (3) the fear by some that integration of schools with local government will result in lower per ADA expenditures is unjustified (in fact the weight of the evidence suggests that fiscally dependent schools have slightly higher per ADA expenditures); and (4) the dichotomy between fiscal dependence and independence, as defined, is not adequate to describe the actual governmental arrangement or relationship between schools and local

government.[1]

The school-local government relationship has been empirically examined in six published research projects within the last twenty years. Of these six, four have been major studies focusing specifically on the impact of the school-local government relationship on school input. The date from these four major studies, conducted by Miner,[2] James,[3] Vincent,[4] and Dye[5] show that neither fiscal dependence

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[1]H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 68. James, et al., refer to this problem. "Although some boards of education as well as municipal officials in fiscally dependent districts do not play an active part in the budget preparation, it is evident in some cities that quite early in the budget process the superintendent and his budget director have discussed the revenue and expenditures outlook for the coming budget with members of the board and with municipal officials, where appropriate." The difficulty of classifying school districts as dependent or independent was noted as early as 1938. See Nelson W. Henry and Jerome G. Kerwin, Schools and City Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

[2]Jerry Miner, Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963).

[3]H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966).

[4]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts. Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

[5]Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380.

nor independence result in increased expenditures. Two additional studies, one by Margolis[1] and a second by Campbell,[2] are not major studies of the school-local government relationship but their data add to our information about the effect of this relationship. The data of both the Margolis and Campbell studies reinforce the conclusions of the four major studies.

The early investigation of this issue by Julius Margolis[3] produced evidence that higher expenditures are found in fiscally dependent districts. Unfortunately, the author did not control for geographic location or size of city.[4] The data consisted only of a comparison of per pupil expenditure means in average daily attendance in the fiscally dependent vs. independent city school districts.

Margolis begins his research by asking why city governments must operate under conditions of financial crisis, and what the causes

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1 Julius Margolis, "Metropolitan Finance Problems: Territories, Functions and Growth," Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization, ed. by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 229-293. The data used in this analysis was information on school expenditures from the U.S. Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-54, Statistics of School Systems.

2 Alan K. Campbell, "The Socio-Economic, Political and Fiscal Environment of Educational Policy-Making in Large Cities," The Politics of Education, ed. Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1970), pp. 300-320.

3 Earlier studies on the school-local government relationship as it affects school expenditures include an analysis conducted by Henry B. Woodward, "The Effects of Fiscal Control on Current School Expenditures," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1948. Cited in Public Finances: Needs, Sources and Utilization. A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

4 Margolis examines the 41 largest cities in the United States. He cites New Jersey as an example where there are dependent and independent systems at all categories of size, but he does not indicate the size categories.

of these crises are. He finds these to be intriguing questions because of the tendency of many to view the fiscal problems of the metropolitan area as a result of heavy tax burdens and expended facilities. Yet, he argues, initial investigation suggests that the growth of urban wealth has kept pace with the growth in urban population.

Basing his deductions on these initial findings, Margolis suggests that political factors, not economic factors, cause the financial hardship of metropolitan government, and that structure is a key variable. He argues that fragmentation of the structure of urban government causes conflicts of interest, and that single function governments make it less likely that agreement will be reached on specific issues, preclude the possibilities of consolidating voting strength, and hinder organization, cooperation, and consistent planning. The author uses the school districts to illustrate single-purpose governments with many functions. He claims that these would find it easier to raise revenue by taxation if they were part of the local general-purpose government.

He proceeds with the hypothesis that, if multi-function governmental structures are more desirable for coping with the fiscal problems of cities, then single-function government will be confronted with fiscal problems to a greater degree. To test this assumption, Margolis examines the mean of per pupil average daily attendance expenditures in the 41 largest cities[1] and finds that the ten cities which have municipal

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[1] As listed in the U.S. Office of Education's Biennial Survey of Education, 1953-54, Statistics of City School Systems.

school department spend more per pupil in average daily attendance than the independent school districts of the other thirty-one cities. The dependent districts spend $346.11 per pupil ADA as opposed to the independent school districts, which spend $249.40 per pupil ADA. From a comparison of per pupil expenditures in relation to fiscal dependence vs. independence, Margolis concludes:

> A comparison between fiscally independent school districts and fiscally dependent school districts is of interest since it indicated whether the public will spend more for a public service when it is presented as a single package or as a part of a package for which the specific benefit of the marginal dollar is uncertain. The evidence is far from weighty but it indicates that fiscally dependent departments spend more per pupil than fiscally independent school districts.[1]

Margolis is careful to note that his conclusions refer only to expenditures and do not demonstrate that the dependent school districts provide a better education.

The more comprehensive and statistically sophisticated studies of fiscal dependence vs. independence began with Jerry Miner's analysis.[2] Using least-square multiple regression, the Miner analyses sought to uncover the sources of variations in spending among local schools by analyzing educational expenditures during the period 1959-1960 in 1,100 school districts. This author's work was one of the earliest multivariate analyses which specifically focused on fiscal dependence vs. independence as in independent variable affecting school expenditures.

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1 Julius Margolis, "Metropolitan Finance Problems: Territories, Functions and Growth," Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization, ed. by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 263.

2 Jerry Miner, Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963).

In contrast to the data results of the Margolis investigation, Miner's data indicates that fiscally dependent school systems have lower levels of expenditures. This relationship holds true even when both community ability to support education and cost elements are taken into account. The Miner analysis thus lends some support to the fear that fiscal dependence leads to lower capital outlays, but the conclusions are tentative because of the failure to control for size of city. Thus, differences in expenditures may reflect the increased demands made on large city revenues, rather than community willingness to finance the schools. Miner notes that this may accurately explain the negative coefficient assigned to dependent status:

> The findings of this study indicate that fiscally dependent school systems spend less in all four expenditure categories and that total spending is influenced more by this organizational arrangement than is local spending. However, since fiscally dependent school districts are predominantly located in larger cities, the relationship measured here may simply reflect the general complex of expenditure influences that tend to hold down large city school expenditures.[1]

Although Miner failed to control for size of city, the data collection and subsequent data analysis was one of the first to compare the variations in expenditures among different school systems operating under similar state influence as well as an aggregate analysis of all school systems in the sample.

The Miner analysis was a major and quite comprehensive coverage of both the theoretical and empirical aspects of expenditures as they

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[1] Jerry Miner, Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963).

are affected by the school-local government relationship. Beginning with a review of the reasoning behind educational expenditures the author proceeds to a critical review of previous broad empirical studies of the determinants of total public spending. He then moves to a review of the more narrowly focused research on spending practices of local governmental units within states. From this review of the literature it is apparent that, prior to the Miner analysis, there was a lack of systematic, comprehensive analysis of the relationship of demographic, social and governmental characteristics as they relate to educational expenditures. Aware of these shortcomings, Miner's analysis aimed at identifying factors that were associated with different levels of educational expenditures through a state by state multiple regression analysis of a random sample of school districts in 23 states. The results of this analysis indicate that total current expenditures per capita are inversely related to school fiscal dependence. The multiple regression, coding the dependent district as 0, produces a negative coefficient of -6.06. In terms of dollars the dependent school district spends $43.26 less per pupil than does the independent district. The results of this regression are presented in the table on the following page.

TABLE II

Results of multiple regression analysis of school expenditures for fiscally dependent vs. independent districts, 1959-60.

	Regression Coefficients
1. Total current expenditures per capita	-6.06
2. Local expenditures per capita (total current expenditures minus state and federal aid)	-1.57
3. Total current expenditures per pupil	-43.26
4. Local expenditures per pupil	-1.40

Data Source: Jerry Miner, Social and Economic Factors in Spending for Public Education (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). Fiscal dependence was coded 0, fiscal independence coded 1.

The data in the Margolis and Miner studies result in conflicting conclusions as to whether the dependent school districts are granted a larger amount of funds than those which are independent.

Later empirical analyses by James, et al.,[1] Dye,[2] Campbell,[3] and

[1] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966).

[2] Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urbar Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI, (August, 1967), 353-380.

[3] Alan K. Campbell, " The Socio-Economic, Political and Fiscal Environment of Educational Policy-Making in Large Cities," The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley, McCutchan 1970), pp. 300-320.

Vincent[1] clearly suggest that both studies go too far by concluding that either fiscal arrangement results in significantly increased or decreased expenditures. These authors find that fiscal dependence or independence alone has little impact on the level of school financial resources. The conclusions of the data from these four studies, and further exploratory analyses, indicate that neither the educator who claims that independent schools are better off financially, nor the political scientist who sees integration as resulting in a higher level of political or community support, can draw decisive substantiation from empirical evidence.

The most thorough and substantial information available to date on the effect that either fiscal dependence or independence has on school expenditures is the statistical analysis conducted by James, et al. The empirical data of this research effort indicate: (1) that the financial resources of a community and the characteristics of the population have a greater impact on school budgets than do structural variables; (2) that the governmental variables are not significant determinants of school expenditure; and (3) that while fiscally dependent districts are fiscally superior to independent school districts, the difference is relatively insignificant.

The analysis of James, et al., focuses on the variation in expenditures for education in large cities and examines school expenditures through a testing of the hypothesis that:

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[1] Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts. Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

> If factors of demand for education and factors of financial ability to pay for education are held constant among school districts, then variations in the organizational structures for financing education will be associated with variation in educational expenditures.[1]

This hypothesis is analyzed through data collected on 107 of the largest school districts in the United States in 1960,[2] and initial analysis through multiple regression of the economic ability and educational demand factors produced a multiple correlation coefficient of .84, indicating that 71 percent of the variance in per ADA expenditures can be explained by environmental variables. When all the measures of governmental arrangements were added, the multiple correlation coefficient

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[1]H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 40.

[2]The sample of school districts included districts from 36 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. The distribution in ADA ranged from 20,000 to 1,000,000 students. All schools in the sample were coterminous with their respective cities.

James, et al., examine the relationship between (a) expectations for educational services, identified as socio-economic characteristics of the community, (b) the financial ability of the community, as measured by income and value of taxable property, and (c) the governmental arrangement of decision-making, of which fiscal dependence or independence is a key characteristic. The educational demand and ability of the community to support education were measured through the indicators of: median family income, percentage of housing occupied by owner, median years of schooling of the adult population, percentage of labor force unemployed, percentage of population non-white, percentage of elementary students in private school, size of total population, assessed property value per ADA. The governmental arrangement variable is operationalized as appointed/elected school board, board selected at large or by wards, appointed/elected tax assessor, fiscal dependence/independence, effective state maximum tax rate or levy, and total average daily attendance. The statistical significance of these variables is evaluated primarily through multiple regression.

increased only to .85. Thus the total amount of variance explained increases only to 2 percent. This indicates that the governmental variables hypothesized to be important are relatively unimportant.

The data on fiscal dependence vs. independence in the James, et al., analysis indicate that the fiscally dependent districts spend a few more dollars per ADA than fiscally independent districts. The authors hypothesize that fiscally dependent districts will spend less per ADA: yet in the sample the effect of fiscal dependence on expenditures is positive. A multiple regression, coding fiscal dependence as one, produced a positive standard regression coefficient of .100. In terms of dollars, the regression coefficient shows that fiscally dependent districts spend 20.4 more dollars per student than do fiscally independent districts. James, et al., conclude that this difference is insignificant and could have easily been due to the chance factor alone. However, additional statistical analysis using the James, et al., data[1] further clarifies the statistical superiority of the fiscally dependent district. Yet despite this increase in statistical significance, the monetary differences in expenditures between the fiscally dependent and independent districts remains small. This empirical evidence is presented in the following table. The independent variables used in the multiple regression analysis are defined on Page 89.

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[1]We are grateful to H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), for including their data on the 107 school districts in the body of the report. This type of scholarship is to be applauded.

TABLE 111

MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF 16 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES PREDICTING EXPENDITURES PER ADA

	Equation A (James, et al.'s Equation)			Equation B (16 independent variables with regions)			Equation C (same as Equation B, dropping "teach" variable)		
Variable	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error of Regression Coefficient	t	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error of Regression Coefficient	t	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error of Regression Coefficient	t
AV/ADA	.00258	.00127	2.02*	.00262	.00122	2.33*	.00262	.00112	2.34*
MFI	.0353	.00929	3.79**	.0208	.00853	2.44*	.0212	.008	2.50*
OOH	- 1.61	.529	3.04**	- .292	.548	.53	- .253	.540	.46
MYS	18.8	8.56	2.20*	11.1	7.73	1.43	9.85	7.42	1.32
UNEMP	22.1	4.03	5.47**	12.2	4.09	2.98**	12.3	4.07	3.01**
NON-WH	- 1.07	.651	1.65	.149	.620	.24	.108	.614	.114
PVT SCH	1.56	.662	2.36*	1.28	.646	1.98	1.29	.644	2.00*
AV RATIO	- .296	.456	.65	.171	.434	.33	.172	.432	.39
LOG ADA	- 8.63	19.1	.42	4.40	16.9	.26	6.63	16.4	.40
BD APP	-23.1	14.3	1.61	-18.2	12.8	1.42	-16.3	12.4	1.32
BUS MGR	- .728	14.8	.48	-27.1	13.6	1.98	-27.5	13.6	2.03*
BD SEL	4.49	12.6	.35	- 6.09	11.5	.527	- 5.97	11.5	.51
ASS EL	- 4.28	11.6	.35	-16.4	10.6	1.54	-17.3	10.5	1.65
OTH AG[1]	20.4	13.4	1.52	24.0	11.7	2.04*	26.1	11.2	2.32*
ST MAX	-10.5	10.9	.97	- 8.75	9.82	.89	- 9.30	9.75	.95
TEACH	.782	.809	.97	.435	.705	.61	---	---	---
			EAST	84.6	21.9	3.86**	86.0	21.7	3.96**
		REGION	MWEST	76.1	15.5	4.89**	76.2	15.5	4.92**
			WEST	100.7	21.3	4.73**	101.7	21.1	4.81**

*Significant at the .05 level (t 1.99)
**Significant at the .01 level (t 2.64)

Source: H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966).

[1]Other agency is used here by James, et al., to indicate fiscal dependence.

TABLE IV

ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS FOR SIXTEEN VARIABLES BY JAMES, ET AL., TO PREDICT SCHOOL EXPENDITURES

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
AV/ADA	Assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance for the fiscal year 1959-60 or for the calendar year 1960.
MFI	Median family income in 1960 (U.S. census data).
OOH	Percentage of occupied housing occupied by owner in 1960. (U.S. census data).
MYS	Median years of schooling of the adult population over age 25 in 1960 (U.S. census data).
UNEMP	Percentage of labor force unemployed, both male and female, in 1960 (U.S. census data).
NON-WH	Percentage of population non-white in 1960 (U.S. census data).
PVT SCH	Percentage of elementary school pupils attending private schools in 1960 (U.S. census data).
AV RATIO	Ratio of assessed valuation to full value in 1960 (U.S. census data for single-family, non-farm dwellings in 1960, except Texas where ratio given is estimate furnished by local school district).
LOG ADA	Base 10 logarithm of average daily attendance of the district in 1959-60, excluding kindergarten and adult school.
BD APP	Board of Education appointed (coded 1) or elected (coded 0).
BUS MGR	Business manager reports directed to board of education (coded 1) or to superintendent (coded 0).
BD SEL	Board selected at large (coded 1) or by wards (coded 0).
ASS EL	Assessor elected (coded 1) or appointed (coded 0).
OTH AG	Another governmental agency has authority (coded 1) or does not have authority (coded 0) to reduce the board of education budget.
ST MAX	There exists (coded 1) or does not exist (coded 0) an effective state maximum tax rate or levy. (See text for further explanation of this variable.)
TEACH	Percentage of full-time teachers not on the regular salary schedule.
EXP/ADA	Total current expenditures per average daily attendance for the district in 1959-60.
EAST MWEST WEST	Dummy variables for region. Coding is 000 for Southern districts, 001 for Western districts, 010 for Midwestern districts, and 100 for Eastern districts.
PRICE	State average salary of total instructional staff (1960), used as an indicator of price level.

Source: H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), pp. 136-137

The importance of fiscal dependence vs. independence was explored further through multiple regression by altering the James, et al., explanatory model.[1] The authors' initial investigation regressed sixteen variables

[1]The H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 123, regression indicates that the variable of unemployment has a significantly high predictive capacity (t=3.79) of school expenditures. The authors note that they are somewhat baffled by the positive relationship between unemployment and increased expenditures. They did not expect that unemployment would increase spending for public education. However, they leave the variable in their equation and suggest that further analysis be made of this relationship but do not attempt to explain the relationship except that "certain rigidities in the institutional arrangement for education kept the level of services high even after some of these socio-economic indicators had turned downward."

A possible explanation of this relationship is that median family income is a good predictor of the average income, but as a statistic based on a particular time period it may not be a good measure of the typical economic conditions in a community over a period of time. If the variable of unemployment is added to the equation, the variable provides a mechanism to adjust the prediction for short-term perturbations in median family income variable caused by economic fluctuations. While we did not attempt a major test of this association, a crude test has been made using the James, et al., data. If this explanation is correct, the predictive value of median family income should decrease when not paired with the unemployment variable. To test this explanation, the James, et al., regression was run, deleting the unemployment variable, which did result in a small decrease in the explanatory value of median family income. A second equation including regional variables and excluding the "teach" variable, which for reasons explained later in this chapter is believed to be a better formulation of explanatory variables, was then run with and without deleting the unemployment variable. The result again was a decrease in the explanatory value of median family income.

COMPARISON OF MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME AS PARTIAL PREDICTOR OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE IN FOUR REGRESSION EQUATIONS

	Coeff.	Std. Error	t
James Equation	.0353	.00929	3.79
James Equation (deleting unemployment)	.0348	.01066	3.26
New Equation (deleting teachers & region)	.0212	.00848	2.50
New Equation (deleting unemployment)	.0172	.00874	1.97

As is evident from the statistics in the above table, the change in the predictive capacity of median family income was not dramatic but did decline, as would be expected if the above hypothesis is correct. While no firm conclusion regarding the relationship is justified, there does appear to be good reason to accept James' inclusion of the unemployment variable, and to expect and accept the positive sign of its coefficient.

thought to explain expenditures per ADA. In this equation (Equation A, Table II), fiscal dependence was positively related to higher expenditures with a t value (1.52), not significant at the .05 level. When the variable of region is introduced by James, et al., to the regression equation (Equation B, Table II), the statistical significance of fiscal dependence increases to the .05 level. In a third equation, dropping one of the James, et al., independent variables, fiscal dependence further increases in statistical significance.

Included in the explanatory model used by James, et al., is the independent variable "percentage of teachers not on the regular salary schedule." James, et al., justify the use of this factor as an independent variable because "it is possible that this is a method used by the administration and the board to keep expenditures down."[1] They define this variable as percentage of teachers who are given temporary appointments rather than being on the regular salary schedule. It seems reasonable, however, to argue that this "teach" variable is a dependent variable, a result of the financial resources available to schools, rather than a causal variable. Teacher salaries are determined by expenditure rather than the reverse. In the third multiple regression equation presented in Table II, this variable is deleted. When this variable is taken out of the equation, the t statistic increases from 2.04 to 2.32, yet additional expenditure per ADA only increases from $24 to $26. The empirical evidence demonstrates

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[1] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 123.

that fiscal dependence does result in higher per pupil expenditures but the monetary difference in per pupil ADA expenditures is small.

A more recent argument for the insignificance of fiscal dependence vs. dependence as an influential variable on school input, and on some aspects of school output such as school dropout rates, appears in analysis conducted by Dye.[1] Dye defines school inputs as pupil expenditures, school tax rates, percentage of school expenditures raised locally, teacher preparation (defined as percentage of teachers with and without college or graduate degrees), teacher salaries, teacher-pupil ratio, teacher turnover, dropout rates, and level of private school enrollment. These variables are correlated with the structural variables: method of school board member selection, basis of school board representation, method of assessor selection, fiscal dependence vs. independence, form of city government, and partisan vs. nonpartisan elections. The relationship of the structural variables to school input and some variables of output are presented in Table V.

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[1]Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380. Dye examined structural variables and environmental variables in order to provide an answer to the question, "Do structural variables in school politics independently influence educational outcomes? OR Are educational outcomes determined by environmental variables without regard to structural variables?" Dye's universe consists of 67 large central cities for which data on environmental variables and structural policy was available.

The author reasons that demand for educational services and ability to support these educational services are a result of environmental variables and selects city characteristics which reflect these conditions: size of city population, level of adult education, occupation and income, racial composition and property value. He then reasons that structural variables shape or determine the effectiveness of demands and hypothesizes that communities of higher socio-economic status will be best able to organize to utilize structure.

TABLE V

SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF FOUR STRUCTURAL VARIABLES WITH ELEVEN MEASURES OF SCHOOL INPUT AND SCHOOL OUTPUT

Measures of School Input and School Output	Structural Variables							
	School Board Selection		School Board Representation		City Control of Budget		Type of Ballot	
	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.	Sim.	Par.
Per Pupil Expenditures	.07	-.15	.05	.01	.19	.23	.08	.12
Expenditures Relative to Income	-.27	-.11	-.05	-.11	-.02	.06	.02	.14
School Tax Rate	-.07	.10	.05	-.10	-.07	-.05	.07	.00
Local School Support	-.01	-.08	.05	-.03	.10	.09	-.01	-.01
Teachers Salaries	-.02	-.08	-.05	-.09	.03	.03	-.10	-.07
Teachers Turnover	-.28	-.23	.00	.10	.00	.11	.00	.15
Teacher-Pupil Ratio	-.02	.08	-.05	.07	-.33*	-.36*	-.23	-.16
Teachers Without Degree	.23	.09	.00	.06	.45*	.27*	.41*	.23
Teachers With Masters	-.04	-.07	.11	.05	-.08	.00	-.02	.08
Dropout Rate	-.09	-.03	-.03	-.01	-.09	.02	-.08	.07
Private School Enrollment	.18	-.12	-.04	-.09	.11	-.08	.20	.12

Source: Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, III (August, 1967), 353-380. The author explains the simple and partial correlation coefficients as "partial coefficients show the correlations between policy variables and each structural variable while controlling for all other structural and environmental variables; an asterisk indicates a significant relationship at the .05 level." Structural characteristics are defined as follows:

(1) School Board Selection: 0 = elected, 1 = appointed
(2) School Board Representation: 0 = by ward, 1 = at large
(3) City Control of Budget: 0 = no city review, 1 = city review
(4) Type of Ballot: 1 = nonpartisan, 2 = partisan.

Beginning with an analysis of the correlation coefficients of the environmental variables as they relate to school output, the data indicates that wealth is a principal determinant, that both median family income and property value show a relationship to per pupil expenditures, and that size of city proves to be as important a variable as does proportion of non-white populations. Higher per pupil expenditures are found in cities which are larger, have higher median family incomes, and have higher property values. Yet while the environmental variables demonstrate a strong association with educational output, the structural variables indicate only a slight association. The coefficients for the 67 cities of the relationship between educational outcome and structural variations are statistically insignificant; they do not reach the .05 level. The data in the Dye analysis indicates: (1) that fiscally dependent schools do not automatically spend less money on education that independent school systems; and (2) that fiscal dependence vs. independence has no impact on any of the school input variables examined. The variable of fiscal independence vs. dependence has no significant impact on teacher salaries, dropout rate, teacher-pupil ratio, school tax rate or level of local school support. The only significant relationship between fiscal independence and school input variables appears in the variable of proportion of teachers without college degrees. The fiscally independent school district is characterized by a higher proportion of teachers with a college degree than the fiscally dependent school district. Outside of this input variable, fiscal independence vs. dependence is statistically insignificant as an influence on school input.

Further substantiation of the insignificance of the fiscal dependence/ independence variable as related to school expenditures is provided by an

analysis of central city and suburban school expenditures. The Campbell[1] research compares educational expenditures per student and total educational expenditures per capita for central city and suburban areas during the 1962 fiscal year. It indicates that the variable of fiscal dependence vs. independence is basically insignificant.

Campbell briefly reviewed the earlier studies, including both James and Miner, and concluded that "none of these studies supports the notion that one kind of system has a great fiscal impact on the schools."[2] The author then investigated this relationship further by broadening the concept of dependence and independence beyond fiscal control to include control over decisions on the administration and curriculum of the school itself, and the personnel who performed these responsibilities. From these three categories of power, the author develops a continuum measuring the degrees of dependence and independence. At one end of the continuum is the school system in which the state reviews and approves the local budget, makes all decisions on curriculum and administration, and appoints all school personnel. At the other end of the continuum is the school district in which control over school budget, curriculum decisions, and appointment of personnel is in the hands of the electorate. None of the school systems in the Campbell sample fall at either end of the continuum, but are distributed at different points along this measure. In this analytical framework, 37 school systems of the largest cities in the United States were placed along the continuum

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[1]Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, City Schools--Suburban Schools (New York: Syracuse Press, 1972), p. 310. See in particular Chapter 6.

[2]Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, City Schools--Suburban Schools (New York: Syracuse Press, 1972), p. 117. It should be noted that Campbell does not present the data from regression analysis of fiscal dependence vs. independence in his book. Rather he reports on the results.

and analyzed through multiple regression analysis. Campbell controlled for income, enrollment ratio, and state aid in his examination of current educational expenditures per student and current educational expenditures per capita. From this analysis Campbell concludes, "In both cases, the position of the school systems along the continuum had very little impact on the level of school expenditures."[1]

These findings reinforce the findings of James, et al. However, Campbell only explains the relationship between school district dependence vs. independence, and fiscal performance; he does not report or include the regression or correlation coefficients.

The analyses of James, et al., Dye, and Campbell agree that the variable of fiscal independence by itself does not necessarily lead to a wealthier school district or higher per pupil expenditures. Also, their analysis points to the overriding importance of the urban environmental variables in influencing school input. These findings are supported in an additional exploratory study by William Vincent.[2] Vincent's definitions of fiscal dependence and independence differ from the other studies, and there are questions about the reliability of the statistical conclusions. His data is included here, however, because of the additional insight it provides on the importance of fiscal dependence vs. independence when analyzed with the other variables (i.e., presence or absence of a tax limit and presence or absence of a public vote).

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[1]Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, City Schools-Suburban Schools (New York: Syracuse Press, 1972), p. 119.

[2]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

Vincent defines fiscal dependence as the arrangement by which the school district budget must be approved by some non-school governmental agency, or a non-local governmental agency such as the state department of education. This is broader than the definition used by James, et al., which refers only to the school and municipal government relationship. Vincent defines fiscal independence as occurring when the local school board is not required to submit its budget for the approval of any other governmental agency. He includes in his analysis the independent variables of a tax limitation vs. no tax limitation, and presence or absence of a public vote. The tax limit is defined as a millage, dollar amount or percentage of assessed full cash value of property set by law as a limit which the tax levy for school purposes may not exceed. The public vote is defined as the actual annual exercise of a vote on the entire budget requiring a levy above a legal tax limit. Statistical analyses of these four independent variables as they relate to school inputs include: (1) a comparison of the mean of school inputs for ninety-four variables; and (2) a multiple regression of four structural variables with measures of school expenditures.

The Vincent data indicate that even when the wealth of the community is taken into account, fiscal independence may result in a higher level of school expenditures, depending upon whether or not a tax limit exists. In other words, other structural variables such as the tax limit and the public vote affect how fiscal dependence vs. independence relates to level of expenditures. Vincent's multivariate analysis indicates that the fiscally independent district with a tax limit has the poorest composite fiscal

performance.[1] Thus it is apparent that it is necessary to control for several structural variables when analyzing school expenditures.

The Vincent data collection consists of information on school expenditure for 1,215 city school districts. Analysis of the fiscal independence vs. dependence variables, as they are related to means of school expenditures,[2] shows

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[1]Composite fiscal performance is a variable created through factor analysis and represents the following combination of twenty-three factor loadings: (1) Maximum teachers' salary; (2) Teachers' salary of the tenth salary step with a Master's Degree or equivalent; (3) Beginning teachers' salary; (4) Average teachers' salary; (5) Effective buying income per capita in 1952; (6) Effective buying income per capita in 1962; (7) Amount raised locally per pupil in average daily attendance in 1942-43; (8) Clerical workers per 1000 pupils in average daily attendance; (9) Net current expenditures per pupil in average daily attendance in 1942-43; (10) Percent non-white population is of the total population; (11) Amount raised locally per pupil in average daily attendance in 1962-63; (12) Effective buying income per capita in 1942; (13) Percent of total teaching staff holding Master's Degrees; (14) Percent that summer school enrollment in average daily attendance is of average daily attendance for regular school year; (15) Percent having adult education programs; (16) Percent that district's average teachers' salary is of average teachers' salary for state; (17) Net current expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance in 1962-63; (18) Guidance counselors per 1000 pupils in average daily attendance; (19) Percent that amount raised locally for schools is of total local municipal and school revenue; (20) Total local municipal or general revenue per pupil in average daily attendance in 1962; (21) Percent of total teaching staff holding Doctor's Degrees; (22) Percent that college graduates are of total population; and (23) Percent that degreed teachers are of total teaching staff.

[2]School expenditure is the dependent variable, labeled fiscal performance, consisting of ninety-four individual variables including teachers' salaries, school board elections partisan/nonpartisan, counselors per ADA, net current expenditures per ADA, amount raised locally per ADA, percent of total teaching staff holding Bachelor's, Master's and Doctor's Degrees and variables measuring characteristics of school board members.

List of variables included growth index of net current expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance from 1942-1943 to 1962-1963, growth index of state aid per pupil in average daily attendance from 1942-1943 to 1962-1963, other aid including federal funds per pupil in average daily attendance for the same period, number of certified specialists from other agencies, percent that state and other non-local aid for schools are of total intergovernmental revenue for municipal and school purposes in 1962, percent that school expenditures are of total municipal and school expenditures less capital outlay in 1962.

the fiscally independent school district to be superior. Table VI presents some of the means of school input variables for comparison. A comparison of the means of school expenditures for both fiscally dependent and independent districts indicates that the fiscally independent district has a higher level of fiscal performance than the fiscally dependent district. The fiscally independent district spends more per pupil ADA, has a higher average teacher salary, higher beginning teacher salary, a higher number of certified specialists from other agencies, a higher percentage of teachers holding Master's Degrees, and a smaller share of local tax revenues going for municipal purposes. Dependent districts are characterized by having a larger share of local tax revenues go for municipal purposes, yet they fare better in obtaining aid from state tax sources, pay teachers less, and have fewer guidance counselors. Table V presents a comparison of the means of five school input variables by category of budget approval.

A comparison of average expenditures indicates that the fiscally independent district is superior. However, firm conclusions cannot be drawn regarding the relationship between method of budget approval and level of expenditure. Regressions of the data indicate that the relationship is affected by school size, tax limitation, and the public vote.

The regression of structural variables with measures of school expenditures indicates that fiscal independence is most significantly related to teacher salary factors. Fiscal independence is significantly related (.01 level) to beginning teacher salaries, maximum

TABLE VI

A COMPARISON OF THE MEANS OF FIVE SCHOOL INPUT VARIABLES BY CATEGORY OF BUDGET APPROVAL AND BY SIZE GROUP, 1962-63

	Method	Group 1 100,000 or more	Group 2 50,000 to 99,999	Group 3 25,000 to 48,000	Group 4 12,000 to 24,999	Group 5 6,000 to 11,999	Group 6 3,000 to 5,999	Total
State Aid Per ADA	Dependent	190.92	156.55	155.36	260.40	151.57	162.36	158.17
	Public Vote	136.28	151.17	228.12	210.75	218.11	216.28	193.45
	Independent	130.99	139.79	194.85	207.01	197.12	205.54	179.22
	Tax Limit	161.68	152.95	185.45	207.47	189.12	190.26	181.14
	Independent/No Public Vote	138.02	138.72	174.06	190.34	170.28	187.52	166.49
Average Teachers' Salary	Dependent	6580.75	6441.73	6349.19	617. 05	5897.40	5784.58	6205.12
	Public Vote	6497.65	6612.06	6455.07	6574.37	6647.95	6621.24	6568.06
	Independent	7088.95	6353.00	6576.37	6510.24	6398.20	6296.57	6537.22
	Tax Limit	7039.89	6478.64	6488.35	6511.05	6249.79	6046.57	6469.05
	Independent/No Public Vote	7085.21	6090.35	6403.80	6383.25	6114.92	5799.73	6312.88
Number of Guidance Counselors per 1,000	Dependent	0.97	0.81	1.10	1.07	0.99	1.04	1.00
	Public Vote	0.50	0.85	0.85	1.10	1.26	1.29	0.97
	Independent	0.93	0.81	0.92	1.02	1.21	1.20	1.01
	Tax Limit	0.89	0.78	1.04	1.06	1.11	1.07	0.99
	Independent/No Public Vote	1.17	0.69	0.89	0.92	1.15	1.07	0.38

(TABLE VI--Continued)

	Method	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6	Total
Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Master's Degree 1963-64	Dependent	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.27	0.27	0.24	0.28
	Public Vote	0.33	0.31	0.24	0.34	0.35	0.33	0.32
	Independent	0.35	0.30	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.31	0.33
	Tax Limit	0.36	0.30	0.30	0.33	0.31	0.27	0.31
	Independent/No Public Vote	0.35	0.29	0.36	0.33	0.30	0.27	0.32
Number of Certified Specialists from Other Agencies per 1,000 pupils per ADA	Dependent	0.61	0.52	1.13	0.67	0.49	0.69	0.68
	Public Vote	0.21	0.13	0.46	0.65	0.33	0.85	0.44
	Independent	0.13	0.22	0.77	0.57	0.52	0.86	0.51
	Tax Limit	0.57	0.22	0.48	0.51	0.32	0.65	0.46
	Independent/No Public Vote	0.02	0.22	0.97	0.34	0.73	0.79	0.51

Source: Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and W. S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (New York: Columbia Teacher's College, Columbia University, 1967), pp. 70-109. The authors do not indicate levels of significance. The authors only say that "a computation of the mean of each of these variables by category of budget approval and by size group was compiled and the significance of differences of means calculated for the total of the districts in each category of budget approval," p. 26.

teaching salaries and salaries of teachers with master's degrees.[1] However, when the tax limitation variable is combined with fiscal independence, no significant relationship is found with any of the ten measures of fiscal performance. These relationships are presented in Table VII.

Adding wealth as an independent variable, the regression analysis demonstrates that wealth (significant at .01 level) accounts for more variance than any other independent variable in the study,[2] confirming previous studies which show the relationship between fiscal capacity and fiscal performance. Regardless of the type of budget approval employed, as wealth increases, fiscal performance increases. When

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[1]Variables analyzed in the regression equation as independent variables: fiscal dependence/independence; tax limitation/no tax limitation; tax limitation/no tax limitation-fiscal dependence/independence; interaction; size; quatratic size; fiscal dependence/independence-size interaction; tax limitation/no tax limitation-fiscal dependence/independence-size interaction; and ratio enrollment 1962-42 against the dependent fiscal measures of net current expenditure 1962, net current expenditure 1942, amount raised locally 1962, amount raised locally in 1942, average teachers' salary, percentage that salaries in the district are of salaries in the state, beginning teachers' salary, maximum teachers' salary, salary of the tenth step of the salary schedule with a master's degree, and ratio of amount raised locally for schools to total local revenue.

[2]Vincent regressed eight combinations of budget approval with wealth on the composite fiscal performance variable. The results of this regression indicate that wealth is a more reliable predicter of fiscal performance than any of the budget approval combinations. Critical levels are shown below:

BUDGET APPROVAL COMBINATION	CRITICAL LEVEL OF EFFECT ON COMPOSITE FISCAL PERFORMANCE
Fiscal independence	.85
Tax limitation	.01**(negative)
Fiscal independence plus no tax limit	.05*
Size	.63
$Size^2$	.72
Fiscal independence plus size	.44
Wealth (effective buying income)	.00**

TABLE VII

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: VARIANCE AND CRITICAL LEVELS, REGRESSION OF FIVE MEASURES OF BUDGET APPROVAL AND SIZE ON THREE MEASURES OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE AND COMPOSITE FISCAL PERFORMANCE, 1200 SCHOOL DISTRICTS

		Beginning Teachers' Salaries	Maximum Teachers' Salaries	Teachers' Salaries at Level 10 of employment	Composite Fiscal Performance Variable
Fiscal independence	R^2	.010	.006	.007	.008
	CL	.000**	.004**	.002**	.001**
Tax limitation	R^2	-.000	-.001	-.001	-.000
	CL	.520	.152	.286	.976
Tax limitation plus fiscal independence	R^2	.001	.000	.000	.000
	CL	.198	.787	.902	.666
Fiscal independence plus size	R^2	.002	.004	.002	.003
	CL	.067	.013*	.067	.011*
No tax limitation plus fiscal independence plus size	R^2	.038	.038	.034	.040
	CL	.000**	.000**	.000**	.000**

* = .05
** = .01
CL = Probability of obtaining the observed sample results if there were no linear relationship between the two variables.

Source: William S. Vincent, An Exploratory Study of the Influence of Statutory Controls on the Fiscal Responsibility of School Boards With Specific Reference to Fiscal Independence, Cooperative Research Project 3737 (Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1967), pp. 44 and 50.

wealth is controlled, the fiscally independent districts with tax limits are the poorest composite fiscal performers. On the other hand, fiscally independent districts without tax limits are the best fiscal performers. Vincent concludes: "Irrespective of wealth, fiscal independence leads to superior fiscal performance if the board may operate without a tax limit."[1] Reflecting on these findings, Vincent postulates that the two patterns of governmental arrangements are reflective of two different types of state policies of regulating school districts. One views education as a function of general government. The other sees the proper governing of education as a function independent of government. The author's initial analysis supports the hypothesis that the fiscally independent school district operating without a tax limit and with the public vote is fiscally superior to the school district operating under the fiscally dependent arrangement with a tax limit. The author ends his analysis with the hypothesis that education is "best served by a government separate from general government with a high degree of dependence upon public consent.[2]

Although not directly comparable to the other studies because of differences in the definition of independent variables, the data in the Vincent sample demonstrate the inconsistency of the effects of fiscal dependence and independence. Both regression analysis and

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[1]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 52.

[2]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

a comparison of means indicates the importance of other structural variables. The data demonstrate that the tax limitation variable is more predictive of fiscal performance when combined with the fiscal dependence vs. independence variable. From this analysis it is obvious that governmental arrangements of the school-local government relationship cannot be considered in terms of one variable; rather they need to be examined as a combination of several patterns of arrangements. Vincent hypothesizes that two predominant patterns should be analyzed; (1) fiscal dependence, tax limitation, appointment of school board members, partisan elections, large geographic size, coterminous school-local government boundaries, and low socio-economic characteristics of school board members; and (2) fiscal independence, no tax limitation, public vote on the school budget, elected school board members, non-partisan school elections, non-coterminous districts, medium to small geographic size school districts, and school board members that have high socio-economic characteristics. Despite the questions that can be raised about the Vincent data suggest that fiscal independence vs. dependence must be examined in multivariate analysis.

The data from the major studies conducted since 1960 indicate that neither the fiscally dependent district nor the independent district consistently spends a significantly higher amount of money educating its students. In some cases the fiscally dependent district has a slightly higher level of expenditures; in others the fiscally dependent district spends more, but the differences are minor and may be due to other factors which have not been controlled. The conclusions are unclear

if one examines only those studies of fiscal dependence vs. independence as a single independent variable because in some instances the data show fiscal dependence to be superior and in others fiscal independence to be the superior arrangement. Yet, when this variable is examined through multivariate analysis the most reliable evidence, that presented by the James et al., work and our further statistical analysis of this data, suggests that there may be a small financial advantage to the dependent arrangement. The James et al., data indicate that the dependent school district spends $26 more per ADA than the independent district spends. Some may argue that this is an insignificant dollar difference. However, if we take into account the total increase of monies that would be available to the individual school, $26 multiplied by total enrollment, the increase is significant.

School Board Selection and Representation

The variables of school board selection methods have been the focal point of much research, yet most of the research relates the appointed or elected method of selection with the board's relationship to the superintendent, the socio-economic characteristics of board members, or describes only the board's legislative function. We are concerned here with assessing the impact of appointed vs. elected school boards, ward vs. at large school board representation, and partisan vs. non-partisan school board election on school input. The evidence indicates that, like the structural variable of fiscal dependence vs. independence, the selection and representation of school board members does not

significantly influence school input. These school board variables show no significant differences when compared on the basis of the level of expenditures, school tax rates, teacher salaries, school facilities, dropout rate, class size, or level of private school enrollment.

It is difficult to formulate a hypothesis predicting the effect of an appointed school board as opposed to the effect of the elected board. On the one hand, elected board members may be more concerned about taxpayer support than the educational needs of students. This sentiment would result in decreased school expenditures. Appointed school board members may be the economic elites of the community; therefore, it would be to their advantage to restrict school expenditures also. On the other hand, elected and appointed school boards could both result in increased expenditures. An elected board member representing the lower socio-economic sector of the community would be likely to support increased expenditures. An appointed school board member of the same sympathies would also support higher expenditures. The data in the James, et al.,[1] sample indicate that an appointed board tends to spend less per ADA than the elected board (coefficient -23.1), but the relationship is not statistically significant. Introducing regions to the regression equation reduces the predictive capacity of the appointed board variable (coefficient -18.2).

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[1] H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 123. The regression results for school board variables are included in Table III, Page 88.

In addition, the regression coefficient for elected boards indicates that the selection of school board members on an at-large basis (coefficient 4.49) results in higher level of expenditures than if selected by wards. Here again, the lack of significance leaves a question mark about any conclusion.

The Dye analysis reinforces the conclusion that the school board selection process is insignificant as a predictor of school expenditures. He finds no significant difference in level of expenditures, teacher salaries, teacher turnover rates, dropout rates, school tax rate, or proportion of teachers with graduate degrees when correlated to the variable of an appointed or elected board, ward or at-large representation, partisan or nonpartisan elections. Dye concludes:

> There is no significant differences in educational expenditures of elected and appointed school boards when high status and low status cities were considered separately.[1]

Evaluating the influence on the basis of school representation, Dye says:

> It was not possible to ascertain any significant relationships between educational outcomes and the method of selecting school board members—whether they are selected by ward or at large. Neither correlation analysis nor investigation of curvilinear relationships produced any evidence that this particular structural variable measurably influences educational policy.[2]

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[1]Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), 353-380.

[2]Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (August, 1967), 353-380.

This correlation analysis also fails to show any significant relationship between partisanship and school input.

The data conclude quite substantially that both method of school board selection and basis of representation are insignificant as predictors of school expenditures. Neither appointed nor elected school board members seem to be particularly reluctant to limit school expenditures.

Formal Participation Variables

Those who have focused on the school-local government relationship have been careful to note the potential importance of the role of the electorate in influencing that relationship, and political scientists have speculated that opportunities for citizen involvement in the school decision process serve as additional means of control over schools. The variables of possible control include voter eligibility requirements, the presence of a public vote on either the entire budget or tax levy and the inclusion of parental advisory groups directly in the decision process. Dye[1] has suggested that even public opinion regarding the public schools may be an important variable influencing expenditures. Yet the absence of a systematic analysis of these variables in the literature is obvious. They have generally been analyzed

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[1]Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), p. 356.

through case studies, rather than examined through aggregate data.[1]

Because of this lack of specific analysis of the participation variable as an influence, we cannot draw any firm conclusions as to the effect of citizen participation on school input. We cannot confirm the political scientists' positions that participation produces "better" schools, leads to higher levels of community support, or different educational policies. We do not know if changes in structural variables allowing more citizen participation significantly influence educational decisions. We can only speculate from limited analysis that allowing for citizen participation does not consistently lead to higher educational expenditures.

Of the authors examined, Vincent[2] made the most detailed investigation

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[1]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Six Urban School Districts (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969). Regarding comparative research on the operations of large city school systems, Gittell suggests that public participation be measured in terms of:

(1) Public voting districts: voting on tax limit, budget, or selection of school board when such elections take place.

(2) Limited public voting: Provision for voting on tax limit, budget, and/or board issue, but where referenda are episodic.

(3) Public participation at hearings: board hearings held routinely on school budgets and/or major need policies.

(4) Limited public participation: public hearings limited to school budget; must major policy decisions discussed and resolved privately.

Gittell charts community voting behavior for the six school districts under investigation in terms of the frequency of school elections, the issues and the degree of actual participation. The author concludes that level of participation measured by voting indicates the minimal role of direct elections as a means of stimulating community interest.

[2]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

of the effect of the requirement for the public vote through aggregate data, first comparing the mean of expenditures and second, multivariate analysis. He finds that the influence of the public vote variable on fiscal expenditure in unclear. In districts requiring such a vote, a larger share of local tax revenues goes for municipal purposes; yet on some measures of fiscal school funding these districts are superior. The public vote district has higher per pupil expenditures in the areas of average teacher salaries and library and audiovisual aids per pupil ADA. In contrast, the public vote district has lower expenditures than the independent district without the public vote in number of guidance counselors per 1,000 pupils per ADA, percent of total teaching staff with master's degree, and number of certified specialists from other agencies per 1,000 pupils per ADA. The multivariate analysis indicates that public vote districts are significantly superior in the areas of net current expenditures, average teacher's salaries, teacher-pupil ratio, guidance counselor-pupil ratio, number of librarians per 1,000 pupils per ADA, number of clerical workers per 1,000 per ADA, and composite fiscal performance.

From the Vincent analysis it appears that public vote does have a significant impact on school expenditures. Unfortunately, additional analysis of the public vote variable is very limited. Dye does not include a participation variable in his analysis on the impact of structural variables on school input, nor does Campbell in his examination of inner city and suburban school expenditures. However, Gittell concludes from in-depth case studies that participation is often ritualistic behavior

and that most major policy decisions are resolved outside the arena of citizen involvement. The limited analysis conducted on Title I fund expenditures indicates that citizen participation did not significantly influence how this money was spent.[1] From these scattered studies we may only hypothesize that the public variable results in increased expenditures.

School District Size

The general consensus of research investigating the size variable is that size is important, but as to exactly how the variable influences school expenditures and policy decisions remains unclear. As discussed earlier, size is not a structural characteristic of the school-local government relationship. However, it is included here for analysis because size is closely associated with fiscal dependence and independence. James, et al., defined the use of school district size as a structural variable because the size of the district is determined to a great extent by the artificial drawing of the boundary lines of the school district, and in many instances, by annexation to the school district from time to time.

It seems plausible to hypothesize that the larger the district the lower the per pupil ADA expenditures because of economies of scale. It certainly seems likely that schools faced with large numbers of students

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[1] Henry M. Levin, "Serrano-Type Expenditures Increases and Their Effects on Educational Resource Allocation and Effectiveness," Occasional Papers in the Economics and Politics of Education (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, December, 1972).

to educate would tend to decrease expenditures. However, the data indicate that an increase in size does not necessarily mean a decrease in expenditures. In fact, the most substantial data indicate that size is not a significant variable. A regression analysis of the James, et al., data including the logarithm of ADA indicates that, while the effect of the variable is negative, it is statistically insignificant. The regression coefficient (-8.63), though negative, is small. Interestingly, when regions are added to the regression equation the coefficient of the variable becomes positive (4.40). In his exploratory study Vincent notes the close relationship between size and fiscal dependence and independence. The majority of the districts in the sample below an enrollment of 25,000 are fiscally independent. He includes size as an independent variable in the multivariate analysis. A regression including the size group variable indicates no significance on current expenditures (CL = .634) or composite fiscal performance. It is significant when regressed with teacher's salaries. When size is combined with the other structural variables of no tax limit and fiscal independence it has significant effects on net current expenditures, teacher's salaries, and composite fiscal performance.[1] In a second regression, combining size with public vote, the data demonstrates that size has significant effects on net current expenditures, teacher's salaries, ratio of guidance counselors, librarians and clerical staff to students per ADA, and composite fiscal

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[1]See Table III in Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 46-47.

performance. Vincent concludes from this analysis that size is an important predictor of fiscal performance, but only when combined with other structural variables.[1] The author notes:

> We do find that state regulations surrounding the process of budget approval appear to make a difference in the fiscal capability of school districts. We cannot be certain that any particular method of budget approval, in and of itself, is responsible. School district size is a troublesome factor whose particular influence, aside from the likelihood that its relation to fiscal criteria is non-linear has not been clarified. The possibility is, it would appear, that an optimum method of budget approval, if there is such a thing, varies with school district size.[2]

Combining Structural Changes

Multivariate analysis of the structural variables indicates that together, just as individually, they do not explain much of the differences in school input. In general, environmental variables exert a greater impact on school expenditures and school input.

The James, et al., data indicate that the combined effect of the structural variables on school expenditures is unimportant. When the structural variables are added to the regression equation of socio-economic variables explaining school expenditures, the analysis of variance increases by only two percent. The authors conclude:

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[1]See Table V in Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 56-59.

[2]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 63.

". . . The amount of variance explained by the measures of governmental arrangements used is clearly disappointing."[1]

The data in one of Dye's samples substantiate further the insignificance of the combined effects of structural variables on school input. In Table VIII the relationships between environmental and structural variables and school input are presented. The environmental variables used in the Dye analysis are: size of city population, median years of school completed by the population, percent of population in white collar employment, median family income, percent of non-white population, and full value of property per pupil. The coefficients of the structural variables, when controlling for environmental variables, are statistically insignificant. Dye summarizes these results after concluding the insignificance of the structural variables individually and together:

> Returning to a central question posed at the beginning of our study, "what are the linkages between urban environment, political system characteristics and educational outcomes?" we were unable to produce much evidence of a strong explanatory linkage between political system characteristics and educational outcomes. Urban environmental force—size, wealth, and socio-economic attributes of population—appeared to directly influence educational outcomes without being mediated by structural variables.[2]

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[1]H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, Cooperative Research Project No. 2389 (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966), p. 123.

[2]Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), p. 379.

TABLE VIII

MULTIPLE AND MULTIPLE-PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND STRUCTURAL VARIABLES ON SCHOOL INPUT AND SCHOOL OUTPUT

	Total Effect Environmental Variables and Structural Variables	Total Effect of Structural Variables	Effect of Structure Controlling for Environment
Per Pupil Expenditures	.74	.20	.16
Expenditures Relative to Income	.54	.29	.15
School Tax Rate	.46	.19	.10
Local School Support	.49	.31	.11
Teacher's Salaries	.60	.13	.00
Teacher Turnover	.46	.38	.21
Teacher Pupil Ratio	.56	.43	.39
Teachers Without Degrees	.69	.58	.35
Teachers With Masters	.35	.14	.03
Drop Out Rate	.42	.17	.03
Private School Enrollment	.75	.51	.19

NOTE: Figures in the first column are multiple correlations utilizing all structural and environmental variables. Column 2 figures represent multiple correlations of structural variables only. Column 3 figures represent multiple-partial correlation coefficients of the effects of structure on school input and output variables with the effects of environmental variables removed. Note the rapidly diminishing effects of structure on school performance variables as they become increasingly isolated from environment.

SOURCE: Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (August, 1967), Table 4, 378.

Multivariate analysis also demonstrates that the variables of structure are not independent of each other; the effects of these variables may be different depending upon how the variables are combined in the regression equations. For example, Vincent's data indicate that the superior district, the district which receives the most financial support, has the highest levels of expenditure, is the one which is fiscally independent and shich also operates without a tax limit. When the variable of fiscal independence is combined with the no tax limitation, the result is significant at the .05 level.[1] A consideration of the variables of public vote, size, fiscal dependence vs. independence, and tax limitation in the Vincent data also indicates that (1) the combination of public vote and modest enrollment (size) affects the buying power of the school; (2) tax limitation combined with fiscal performance hampers the school districts' abilities to compete economically with other agencies relying upon public support; (3) fiscal dependence without tax limitation seems to be advantageous for large-city school districts.

From this analysis we conclude that structural variables analyzed together do not exert a significant impact on school inputs. Under given conditions there may be slight relationships between level of financing and specific combinations of structural variables, but the claims of financial superiority cannot be consistently supported by aggregate data. The James, Dye, and Campbell works support this conclusion. We are reluctant to accept Vincent's conclusions of the

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[1]Marilyn Gittell, T. Edward Hollander, and William S. Vincent, Investigation of Fiscally Independent and Dependent School Districts, Cooperative Research Project No. 3237 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 63.

superiority of the fiscally independent school district because of the constraints of the data collection, the unique definitions of structural variables and the missing clarity of the statistical analysis. Vincent's data collection relies largely on information provided by individual school districts regarding their budgets and does not include a control for geographic size or location.

Conclusions

An investigation of the structural variables reveals the complexity and the difficulty of accurately understanding the actual working relationship between the school and the community. Campbell[1] summarizes the situation well after extensively reviewing the diverse school organizations. He says that he would like to outline for the reader how numerous variables or organization affect schools, but that such controls include both formal and informal, legal and extralegal agreements which are difficult to measure. It is apparent that in the present focus on structural variables we have not examined all the crucial variables, as evidenced by the lack of explanatory power of both the environmental and structural variables selected for analysis.

The importance of the structural variables of the school-local government relationship has been examined empirically as independent variables as they influence school input, and the data indicate that structural variables are not significant influences on school input if input is defined as

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[1]Roald F. Campbell, Luvern L. Cunningham, Roderick F. McPhee, and Raphael O. Nystrand, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970).

level of expenditures, teacher salaries, teacher-pupil ratio, teacher turnover, school tax rate, or percentage of locally raised revenues that are channeled into school fiscal resources. This, of course, is not to say that structural variables have no influence on school input in a particular school. These variables may be important for each individual district. The possibility does exist that aggregate data is too crude a measure to reveal the impact of the influence of existing structural variables on a particular school. However, those who argue for independent schools because they "fare better" financially are generally not supported by empirical analysis.

The initial investigation of the question, "What factors influence school input?" emphasizes the importance of the question rather than closing the issue. For if we accept the empirical evidence that dependent schools which are integrated with local government do not consistently suffer financially, then we must press those who are opposed to integration of the schools with local government to construct new arguments against integration.

The foregoing empirical analysis forces us to set aside arguments over issues of funding and move on to the more difficult questions of the types of changes which occur in substantive spending, school output, or policy decisions in the integrated or autonomous schools. Do educators dominate school policy decisions in spite of structural variations or are they forced to concede to local community demands when school and local government are brought together? Are the curriculum programs of the independent and dependent schools more likely to be adjusted to meet the great variations in community needs? Does inclusion of the public

in the decision-making process substantially change decisions or does the professional educator remain in a controlling power position?

We have yet to determine whether structural variables affect the influence or power of those directly concerned with school outputs. Numerous authors deplore the lack of responsiveness of the schools to community needs and many outline structural reforms, yet at this point we do not have a clear perception of the probable usefulness of structural change. We do not know what degree of structural change is needed to produce a change in the power relations between school boards, governmental officials, teachers, school administrators or taxpayers. Kirst has recommended that the following four changes would increase community control:

(1) board elections by subcommunity districts rather than at large;

(2) all members of school board run at once;

(3) board elections held at the same time as major races for Governor and President; and

(4) optional use of partisan endorsements.[1]

However, until further research is completed we cannot be certain which changes, if any, would increase the school's responsiveness to community needs. What is certain, and contrary to popular thought, is that most common structural variations do not influence school input.

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[1]Michael W. Kirst, "Community Influences for Improving Education," (A paper prepared for Educational Testing Service National Conference on Improving School Effectiveness, Stanford, California, May 11, 1973), p. 14.

CHAPTER 5

WILL NEW STRUCTURE AID THE AIMS OF EDUCATION?

Educators are experiencing increasing pressure from the non-education community. The schools, like the automobile industry, are plagued by the rising expectations of the consumer and by federal government standards. The demands being made upon them are vast, for they are now expected to provide much more than formal instruction alone. Schools are seen as instruments of social policy, agents to foster racial integration, institutions to train the labor force in a variety of vocational skills, and as a means to teach students proper citizen behavior.[1]

Both educators and political scientists have made recommendations as to how schools can deal most effectively with these increasing pressures. The school-local government structural relationship is one of the variables which has been assumed to be an influential factor affecting the amount or type of pressure that is brought to bear upon schools and educators and to affect the capability of the schools to deal

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[1] For an overview of the variety of demands being made on the schools see Roald F. Campbell and Donald H. Layton, Policy-Making for American Education (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, July, 1969); Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Gary S. Becker, Human Capital (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Mario Fantini and Milton A. Young, Designing Education for Tomorrow's Cities (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Frederick M. Wirt, "Contemporary School Turbulence and Administrative Authority," paper presented at the David W. Minar Memorial Conference on Problems in the Politics and Governance of the Learning Community, North Eastern University, October 30-November 1, 1974.

with these pressures. It is the purpose of this chapter to outline some of the remaining questions, and directions for further research, on the role of the structural variables.

Increasing Demands on the Schools: A New Definition of School Responsibilities

Those assessing the problems of urban education for the 70's foresee the schools facing a worsening economic crisis plus increasing demands for additional services.[1] They believe that economic difficulties will be brought on by having fewer tax dollars available, increasing costs of goods and services, and increasing demands for more services as expectations and living standards increase. The dollar difficulty is closely tied to the increasing pressure for more extensive services and reflects the perspective that schools are intertwined in the broad process of creating and developing community environment.

Numerous authors[2] are now discussing the school in terms such as "interdependent with the community social system," as being "caught up in the community policy-making process," or as searching for means "by

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[1] The views of several authors on the problems of urban education are summarized in Urban Education in the 1970's, ed. by A. Harry Passow (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1971).

[2] See Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, and Richard Magat, Community Control and the Urban School (New York: Praeger, 1970); R.J. Snow, "Community Resources and Conflict Propensity as Sources for Constraints on the Local School Administrator," paper presented to Symposium on Community Environments and Administrator Roles, American Educational Research Association Meetings, New York City, February 18, 1967; Peter Binzen, "Philadelphia: Politics Invades the Schools," Saturday Review, 55 (February 5, 1972), 44-49; Mario D. Fantini, "Discussion," Harvard Educational Review, XXXVIII (Winter, 1968), 160-172; Godfrey Hodson, "Do Schools Make a Difference?" The Atlantic (March, 1973), 35-46.

which they may alter or adjust to their environment."[1] This perspective is rather eloquently expressed by a former Commissioner of Education,

> "Opportunity for learning" means, to me, a community where fathers are employed and where children can learn through their fathers about the dignity of man. It means a community where the population of rats does not exceed the population of children, and where children can learn the values of a healthy society. It means a community of clean streets, of playgrounds, of uncrowded homes, where children can learn the value of living in a free country and the importance of keeping it free. And finally, it means a community free of fear, where children can learn to love life and their fellowman.[2]

The tasks that are outlined for the schools run the gamut from providing the culturally deprived child a background as means of social mobility, to enhancing both public and private economic benefits to the community by increasing the earning capacity of the student.[3] Not only are schools

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1 J.E. Allen, Jr., "Educational Problems of the Handicapped in the Inner City," paper presented for the Conference on Problems of Education of Children in the Inner City, Washington, D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1969 .

2 J.A. Allen, Jr. "Educational Problems of the Handicapped in the Inner City," a paper for the Conference on Problems of the Education of Children in the Inner city, Washington, D.C., President's Commission on Mental Retardation, 1969, p.9. An excellent summary of the new demands being placed on the schools is found in Keith Goldhammer, John Suttle, William D. Aldridge and Gerald Becker, Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1967). See also Roald F. Campbell and Donald H. Layton, Policy Making for American Education; (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, The University of Chicago, July, 1969); Mario Fantini and Milton A. Young, Designing Education for Tomorrow's Cities (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Mario Fantini, "Community Control and Quality Education" in Urban School Systems, Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970).

3 Roald Campbell and Donald H. Layton, Policy-Making for American Education (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, July, 1969) note the broad expectations for the schools: "The concept that the school is an instrument to improve the tone and well being of society has never subsided. Frequently, the school is seen as a means of combating crime, of reducing juvenile delinquency, and in short, of teaching the democratic way of life," p. 13.

faced with increasing expectations from professionals, but the availability and acquisition of federal government financial support has added even more pressure to school policy and output. The national government, in addition to minorities and community interest groups, is looking to the school as an agent of reform. Federal legislation, such as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, designed to improve the individual's educational opportunities, is an example of this perspective. It is clear that the federal government is requiring the schools to do more than just teach the 3 R's; that it is asking them to be concerned with the development of the total individual in addition to teaching the 3 R's.[1]

The Head Start program, the manpower training program and the supplementary education centers, are only a few examples of these new demands. An example of the increasing pressure exerted by the federal government on the schools is the actions by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in regard to Chicago public schools in 1966. After investigating charges of segregation in Chicago schools, made by several civil rights groups, HEW withheld approximately $32 million of federal funds appropriated for the schools. The conflict between the citizen group, the school administrators, several senators, the Mayor of Chicago, the Secretary of Health,

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[1]Mario Fantini, "Community Control and Quality Education in Urban School Systems," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), outlines this new demand. Fantini says, "The dominant theme in the new definition (of schools) lies in the effective domain—the development of human beings with a sense of self-worth and an ability to function affirmatively and humanely with their fellowmen," p. 55.

Education and Welfare, and the President of the United States, was resolved through compromise: Chicago received the money, but the school administration was required to take steps toward desegregation.[1]

Pressures come not only from minorities demanding curriculum changes, and from the federal government requiring racial integration and vocational training, but also from the courts, taxpayers, students, teachers and parents.

The clamor of the taxpayer for financial reform to ease his burden, the request of parents for a greater share of the control of school curriculum, the demands of minorities for desegregation, the increasing organization of teachers for collective bargaining, and the new voice of students asking for the opportunity of input in certain policy decisions, are heard in both the educational and political arenas.

These increasing pressures are being felt by both educators and politicians. School superintendents are now including in their list of problems many factors which have historically plagued local government. They list problems which have often in the past been thought to be the exclusive burdens of the political system involving the governing of the total community. Yet now, educators are including in their list such problems as: unpredictable urban population growth and decline; increasing financial problems; the changing nature of intergovernmental relationships; increasing teacher militancy and the need to develop

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[1]For a review of the incident see Roald F. Campbell and Donald H. Layton, Policy Making for American Education (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, 1969), pp. 68-73. Also citizen and governor intervention in teachers' strike in Detroit, August, 1967, analyzed by Campbell and Layton, pp. 73-78.

communication and organizational structures to enhance grievance procedures; the shifting expectations both within the school community and the external community; the increasing role of state and federal government; and pressing community issues which require the schools to operate in the market place of social conflict. School superintendents identify increased pressure, changes in their leadership function, and the demand further to fulfill a large community leadership role as major problems. They feel that the school is "being forced into co-operative relationships with other community agencies without having any real basis for maintaining satisfactory relationships."[1]

Those outside the school organization, such as politicians and many social scientists recognizing these increased demands, do not see these problems, pressures, and conflicts as only "the school's problems," but have unilaterally joined the school administrator in seeking solutions and alternatives. Reflecting the attitude that school problems and local government problems are shared problems, Ravitz outlines this interdependence:

> Unless cities are enabled to cope with their multiple problems, no amount of school money will hold people with children in these cities to use the schools. The plight of the schools and of city governments is interwoven. Together they must approach the state and the federal government and argue their joint need for money to survive. They dare not be divided or become competitive. If their arguments fall on unresponsive ears, than all else we may hope to achieve through the urban school will likewise fail. The children of the central cities will have been thoroughly denied and

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[1]Keith Goldhammer, John E. Suttle, William D. Aldridge, and Gerald L. Becker, Issues and Problems in Contemporary Educational Administration (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 17.

> disinherited. They will have been consigned to wretched lives of hopelessness and dispair. And the society will have undermined itself.[1]

As a result of these increased pressures both educators and political scientists are now examining the capacity of the schools to respond to the growing demands that are being made upon them. Several strategies have been outlined for tackling the school's problems and pressures. These strategies, for the most part, reflect the perspective that schools and local government do have common problems and that schools ought to play a more encompassing role in the community. Reflective of this perspective and much like those o-tlined by others[2] is the strategy for improving the educational performance of poor and minority group children suggested by Miller and Roby.[3] These authors outline a program for

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[1]Mel Ravitz, "Urban Education: Today and Tomorrow," Urban Education in the 1970's, ed. by A. Harry Passow (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1971), p. 192. An excellent summary of the different perceptions is presented by Robert Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael W. Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1970). Lyke states: "the most fundamental conflict underlying the disputes over decentralization isbetween democratic control and prefessional autonomy. Both values are important in American political culture; indeed, as was pointed out above, they have been the source of continual conflict in public education over the past century," p. 122. A good overview of the differing definitions of the schools is presented by Richard O. Carlson, Adoption of Educational Innovations (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1965).

[2]Mario D. Fantini and Milton A. Young outline the basic strategies for reforming urban schools in their book, Designing Education for Tomorrow's Cities (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). They outline six basic strategies of reform: (1) compensatory education; (2) desegregation; (3) development of subsystem experimental units to improve school-community relations; (4) total system reform; (5) new systems development; and (6) parallel systems.

[3]S. M. Miller and P. Roby, "Educational Strategies and the Disadvantaged: An Overview," paper presented at the Seventh Annual Work Conference on Urban Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, June, 1969.

improvement which focuses on five major changes including changing the control of schools by providing for greater community involvement in decision making. However, a comparison of the proposal with others indicates that recommendations for reform, although much alike in calling for change in the control of schools, differ in their basic perspective of the proper amount of power that the educator should hold and the type of structural change involved. Almost all recommendations for change include references to changes in curriculum, the development of private schools or experimental units, various structural changes, desegregation, and greater community involvement. Yet there is a basic division between the degree of structural change recommended and the resulting power position of the educator. On the one hand are those who outline a program which would bring the schools directly under the control of local government and significantly reduce the power of the educator. These individuals believe that bringing the schools directly into the political arena will reduce the degree of conflict and force a compromise between the various competing interests. Illustrating this perspective and calling for a radical change in structure which alters the power position of the "educational administrative bureaucracy" Ravitz claims that curriculum changes and private schools are not enough. He blames the school structural arrangement for many of our educational problems.

> In the light of all these difficulties with the schools, obviously radical change is necessary if our children are to be educated appropriately for the societal demands on them. . . . Now, 1 1 1, a growing number of people are moving in desperation to seek an answer that will provide better quality education for their children now. That answer, many believe, is local community control of the schools that try to teach their children. The growing urban cry for local control, for effective citizen

> involvement, for decentralization, for some increased measure of actual people-participation in managing the schools is a direct reaction to the grossly insensitive conduct of the entire school system by centralized bureaucracy. It is difficult to imagine a more irrelevant school system than now exists in most urban centers. Yet this is not an indictment of many qualified and committed teachers who are trying vainly to teach in such systems. The immense bureaucracy of the public school structure has been unresponsive to innovation and the required rapidity of progressive change.[1]

On the other hand, there are those who believe that the solution to the school's problems lies in greater financial resources and that decisions as to how they are to be used should be left to the professional educator. Those of this persuasion also call for curriculum changes, the development of new learning programs and some structural change. However, their basic premise is that the educator should maintain a predominant position of power in the decision process. This perspective does not deny that schools should play a larger role in community education. Rather, it claims that change should be made without drastically altering the power position of the educator.

A New Role for Schools Necessitates a New Basis of Evaluation

Those describing the present and future increasing role of the schools and the resulting need for a change in structure which facilitates direct community influence, see the schools as only one facet of a much larger change. The community school concept is viewed as only the beginning point;

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[1]Mel Ravitz, "Urban Education: Today and Tomorrow," Urban Education in the 1970's, ed. by A. Harry Passow (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1971).

this perspective envisions similar broadened roles and differing clientele relationships in other governmental agencies providing numerous other services. Fantini summarizes this perspective:

> The community school concept, previously cherished and unquestioned, has now become highly controversial, for it seeks basic structural reform of the system in order to attain quality education, and its hallmark is meaningful community participation. Beginning in New York City, the movement is overshadowing the intensity the somewhat analogous struggle that has raged around client participation in decision making in the anitpoverty programs. In addition, it may be foreshadowing similar movements in other governmental services--for example, law enforcement and welfare programs.[1]

Schools are thus seen as important, but not the only variable molding the community environment. Those promoting this viewpoint talk of total community environment and claim that social environment, influenced by housing facilities and family background, is as important in shaping the individual's life as the quality of the schools. They attack the educator's call for increased funding and hold that increased expenditures for the schools are not needed. In their view, expenditures need to be examined in relation to tother community needs such as housing, sewage, parks, police, and fire. Advocates of community schools hold that too often our solution to community problems has been to increase expenditures rather than to assess total community needs and make efforts to balance and coordinate uses of community resources. Godfrey Hodson, in his article, "Do Schools Make a Difference?" reflects this skepticism as to the need for additional funds for schools. He says that we have been mistaken in believing that granting

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[1]Mario Fantini, "Community Control and Quality Education in Urban School Systems," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry M. Levin (c 1970 by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.), p. 49.

education large sums of money will lead to a gradual withering away of inequality in American life by eradicating it first in education. He notes, "The liberal faith held that expenditure of resources on education would produce not merely a greater equality in scholastic achievement, but greater equality in society."[1] Likewise, another outside observer, Moynihan argues that additional expenditures on education are likely to produce greater inequality in terms of increased income. He says, "It is simply not clear that school expenditure is the heart of the matter."[2] Moynihan holds that after a point, increased school expenditure does not seem to have any notable influence on school achievement, but rather benefits only school personnel. He says, "Any increase in school expenditure will in the first instance accrue to teachers, who receive about 68 percent of the operating expenditures of elementary and secondary schools."[3]

While many political scientists have accepted the new concept of the schools as a community workshop and support the demand for structural changes, the educators themselves still have some reservations. They have responded generally in either of two ways: (1) that the community is demanding too much of the schools—their job is limited to teaching the 3 R's; or (2) they accept the challenge of "the development of human beings with a sense

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[1] Godfrey Hodson, "Do Schools Make a Difference?" The Atlantic (March, 1973), p. 38.

[2] Daniel P. Moynihan, "Equalizing Education: In Whose Benefit?" The Public Interest, 29 (Fall, 1972), pp. 69-89, p. 71.

[3] Daniel P. Moynihan, "Equalizing Education: In Whose Benefit?" The Public Interest, 29 (Fall, 1972), pp. 69-89, p. 71.

of self-worth and an ability to function affirmatively and humanely with their fellowmen."[1] In the case of the second response, they believe that they can accomplish this objective and that the solution lies in better school financing, rather than structural change. The educator feels that with more funds for more programs, quality education could be brought to the disadvantaged. This position is concisely summed up by Lyke when he says:

> Proponents of this view are the first to admit that ghetto education is poor and they admit that some ghetto teachers are not doing their job properly. But the main problem they feel, is not that there is too little contact with the community, but that ghetto schools are poorly financed and managed. If significantly more money were made available, then better teachers could be hired, fewer children put in each class, and more auxiliary and remedial services provided.[2]

The early response of the educators to the increasing demands on the schools to educate all and to deal with the social problems of poverty, racism, delinquency, and social and political alienation has been to deny that these tasks are the tasks of the schools. However, as demands of both the federal government and community groups have increased, the relationship of the schools to local government has changed. This has been an informal change rather than a formal structural change and school administrators are now including in the decision process many non-professional actors. Parents, community groups, municipal officials,

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[1]Mario D. Fantini, "Community Control and Quality Education in Urban Schools," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), p. 55.

[2]Robert Lyke, "Political Issues in School Decentralization," The Politics of Education, ed. by Michael Kirst (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1970), pp. 111-132, p. 124.

and students, together with educators have begun to discuss ways in which these demands can be met.

Beginning in the mid 60's the educators' demands for autonomy have been met with increasing demands for community control and influence on school policy. Community activists, parents, and citizenry began during this period to reject the idea of the school as a totally sacred area of policy making. Action by groups outside the school pushed for changes in curriculum, the decision process, and areas of expenditures. Demands for change brought actual change. Programs for educational improvements were no longer designed only by school administrators emphasizing additional teacher training but were also initiated by Congress and administered by federal agencies. They emphasized community social action and focused on the needs of the disadvantaged rather than teacher improvement programs. They were not conceived or solely executed by teachers. This marked the beginning of the idea that the political environment of school decision making was an important variable influencing the quality of education.

An example of this new type of perspective was the funding received by Grace Hill, in the St. Louis area, in 1965. Grace Hill, an Episcopal social service agency, was given a contract to operate a headstart program which was to be run with OEO and Model Cities grants which came to $200,000 in 1967. Part of this money was used to set up four participatory groups involved in school planning: parent groups, school cabinets, District Education Board (DEB) and Community School Board. Out of this effort was created the Murphy-Blair District Education Board which had the traditional function of supporting school clubs and student tutors, and as a forum for parents with grievances. A conflict arose over control of the community

school in the district; DEB wanted an agreement that would give it leverage to exert pressure and a role in personnel selection, and the school board wanted total control. It was resolved when DEB received $5,000 for a neighborhood survey on directions for the new community school, veto power over school personnel, and a general agreement that Model Cities money would not be spent without approval of the Community School Boards. It was a compromise which granted DEB a potential role greater than any other neighborhood organization had ever been given in St. Louis.[1]

As the demands on the schools have multiplied, many educators have changed their position. They no longer deny that education should be involved in politics but rather claim that the school is directly engaged in political interaction with local government but does not have adequate experience, background or organization to deal with this new role. An example of this attitude is expressed by school superintendents as they outline the dilemmas of educational administration.[2] Superintendents feel that many of their problems arise from the interventions of agencies outside of the schools, as well as from the increasing expectations for the schools from within the community. As school administrators, they

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[1]For more insight into the governance of the St. Louis schools see Frederick M. Wirt, "Theory and Research Needs in the Study of American Educational Politics," Journal of Educational Administration, 8 (1970), 53-87.

[2]Keith Goldhammer, et al., Issues and Problems in Contemporary Education Administration (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1967). The authors, through the support of a U.S. Office of Education grant organized five one-day conferences of school superintendents in different geographical areas. The purpose of the conferences was to open discussion of the problems of administrators.

feel they have been forced to become political figures, coalition builders, who must gather information for various interested groups in the community.

Educators recognize that they are politically involved, and that this involvement is reducing their independence and control over school policy. There is an increasing dependence on federal funds and a consequent loss of control over expenditure decisions. Some superintendents already express this fear. Goldhammer, et al., quote a school superintendent: "Actually, control is present when money is designated for certain types of programs. It gets districts to do certain things in specific areas. We'll get so dependent on this money that we'll have to take it and do what the federal government says."[1]

The U.S. Office of Education's threats to withhold funds until certain conditions prescribed in the Civil Rights Act are met, gives increased power to federal government pressure on school superintendents, and educators are recognizing that their domain of independence is shrinking. The educator identifies the school's dependent relationship with local government despite formal independent structural arrangements. School administrators report that the "school is being forced into cooperative relationships with other community agencies without having any basis for maintaining satisfactory relationships,"[2] and that the

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[1]School administrator's remarks at Superintendent Conference. The authors do not identify the individual. See Keith Goldhammer, et al., Issues and Problems in Contemporary Education Administration (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 13.

[2]Keith Goldhammer, et al., Issues and Problems in Contemporary Education Administration, (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 17.

administration of schools in large, complex urban communities is "no longer independent of the government of the municipality even if it is fiscally independent."[1]

The new demands that have been placed on the schools and their subsequent new role have increased their impact. They are now a force influencing social, political, racial, and economic values, operating as miniature community workshops preparing individuals (and not just the young) to live in the total community. Presently, the community school is a vehicle of service to the community far beyond that of formal instruction alone. We have established broad goals for the schools. From this it follows that the schools must be evaluated on a much broader basis than when they were halls of academic learning alone. Schools must now be evaluated not only on the basis of ouptut, academic achievement, but also in terms of the provisions made for democratic participation of the community in the school decision-making process, the distribution of power between the participants in that process and the policy formulated designed to meet these demands.

Such an evaluation process has been initiated by numerous empirical researchers and analytical observers, and their conclusions are jointly condeming. The schools are not performing as they should. From this observation has come proposals for change. Havighurst describes well the current evaluation and two major types of response of most school observers.

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[1]Keith Goldhammer, et al., Issues and Problems in Contemporary Education Administration, (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 17.

> When we look at what has happened in big city education since 1963, we see two contrasting pictures--both accurate. On the one hand, we see massive, bureaucratic school systems responding ineffectually to the pressures of rapid social change in our cities. They are being criticized analytically by social scientists, venomously by anarchists, frantically by desperate parents, coldly by teachers' unions, and passionately by young men and women who are just discovering that the world is a difficult place to live in. On the other hand, we see a growing number of research and development efforts, creative and solidly supported by systematic evaluation, which are building the base for an educational program that promises within the next decade to substantially eliminate the widespread educational retardation of children and youth in the big cities.[1]

Included in this second type of response to the awareness of the shortcomings of the schools, is a proposed formal structure change in the school-local government relationship. A systematic evaluation assessing the impact of this variable is important because it is believed to affect most of the major variables used as criteria for evaluating the schools; school inputs, participants in the decision process, and the distributor of power among participants.

The investigation conducted here has been limited to the first criteria of evaluation, school input.

Conclusions of the Investigation and Future Research Needs

Investigation of the impact of the school-local government relationship on schools strengthens the case of those calling for structural

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[1]Robert J. Havighurst, "Public Education for Disadvantaged Urban Minorities," Urban Education in the 1970's, ed. by A. Harry Passow (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1971).

change. The basic objection to such change has been that schools will suffer financially. Empirical evidence indicates that this objection is not valid. An evaluation of the effect of the structural relationship between schools and local government on school input leads to the conclusion that the nature of formal structural arrangement between the schools and local government does not significantly affect school input. The educator's fear is that a change in the formal structural relationship from independence to dependence will necessarily be financially detrimental are unjustified. This information calls for an analysis of the impact of the school-local government relationship on school policy.

In the past, educators have feared that structurally dependent schools suffer financially. They have believed that independence is the only sure way to avoid the diversion of school funds to nonschool purposes, and that independence leads to greater stability and continuity in educational planning because school authorities know what they can count on. However, the data analyzing the structural arrangements as independent variables affecting school input indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the resources which are available to autonomous school districts and those available to districts under local government. In fact, the most substantial information indicates that the dependent school district is likely to have slightly higher expenditure per ADA. An examination of the impact of the structural variables of appointed vs. elected school boards, representation on ward or at-large basis, and partisan vs. nonpartisan school elections, shows no significant relationship between these variables and level of expenditures, school tax rates, teacher salaries, school facilities or

class size. The data on the structural relationship between the school and local government indicate that school input is not significantly affected by the structural relationship with local governments.

Because it is clear that the structural variables as defined are not significant determinants of school resources, it now becomes important to move to an evaluation of the relationship of structure to the other criteria variables of school performance. From this initial investigation five further specific research needs are apparent: (1) an examination of the two predominant structural models of the school-local government relationship as they affect school policy decisions; (2) a comparison of the participants in the school policy decision process in both types of school-local government arrangement; (3) an examination of the power position of the educator in the decision process in the two contrasting structural models; (4) an examination of the types of issues raised, the items of conflict and the compromises reached and the alternatives available to the decision makers in each structural model; and (5) an assessment of the types and impact of the changes that are occurring informally as a result of the new demands on schools.

One major point of those dissatisfied with the schools is that school policy does not reflect community diversity. Although the empirical evidence strengthens the argument for investigating the benefits of an integrated school, this information does not substantiate the claim that integrated schools vs. autonomous schools produce different policy. School policy output is an indicator of the power of those involved in the decision process. The decision as to how to spend the available financial

resources is a better indicator of control than is the amount of resources that the schools accumulate. To evaluate the impact of structural variables on school policy, data must be collected and analyzed on school policy rather than school input. An examination of school expenditures would be one way of analyzing that relationship.

Salisbury[2] and those supporting the integration of schools with local government are arguing that integration is best because this type of arrangement would insulate the schools from direct interest group pressure, put them in a better bargaining position with local government for taxpayer funds, and increase cooperation between the schools and local government in solving community problems. Their argument does not focus on resources. Rather, the objective of this type of structural reform is an alteration of the educator's power over school policy. The desired end is school policy that reflects diversified interests and diversified community needs, a process of decision making which includes non-educators. An evaluation of the relationship of schools and local government to educational resources does not provide a basis for evaluating these claims. However, because of the influence that schools have on both the academic and political education of all groups in the community it is important to evaluate the decision-process and consequent policy of the integrated vs. autonomous school.

Because schools are vehicles for transmitting political and social values, the school policy process should include community political actors, parents, taxpayers, and non-school personnel. Schools should be

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[1]Robert Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review, 37 (Summer, 1967), 408-424.

brought under the supervision of local government because school policy needs to be made in relationship to an overall assessment of community needs, goals and resources. School policy has a wide impact on the entire community. Many observers of the schools have reservations about the ability of the professional educator to perceive, understand and formulate policy which meets the needs of so many diverse groups. Those of this persuasion have serious doubts that the professional educator is able to recognize the needs of the culturally or sociallly deprived child and formulate appropriate school policy supported with the necessary expenditures. They believe that the educator's racial and socio-economic background are usually quite different from that of the culturally deprived minority child. This difference often causes middle-class professional educators to design educational programs which are best suited for middle-class, WASP students. A comment made on the Bundy Report reflects this criticism. Advocating community control of the schools, the reviewer says that the school system is a "system already grown rigid in its negative powers which has been called upon to meet the unexpected challenge of an extraordinary immigration of impoverished citizens whose children have special needs for the very best our schools can offer, and the system has not effectively met this challenge."[1]

Several authors suggest that educators have resisted integration or cooperation with local government agencies because they want to maintain their monolithic control over education. This autonomy may allow educators to formulate policy that ignores the educational needs of numerous

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[1]Bonnie Stretch, "The Bundy Report," Saturday Review, XLIX (May 21, 1966), 56.

groups in the community either because they want to ignore these needs or because they want to concentrate on other goals. These questions are therefore posed: "Is the professional aware of the diverse needs of certain groups, particularly the poor?" "Is the educator willing to follow through with the formulation of policy that is geared to meeting their needs?" Meeting broad educational needs requires wider views than those usually possessed by educational specialists (or any single person, group, or profession) and requires continual innovation and change in school policy.

Change which will enable the schools to meet these challenges is needed. These changes should include ways of alleviating the pressures on schools by dividing and coordinating the task with other agencies involved with the delivery of community services, and in balancing the needs of the total community by including the schools as agents responsible for the total development of the individual. School output affects the entire community, economically, politically and socially. The push for structural reform does not challenge the educator's decision as to how best to teach math or reading skills. It does, however, challenge the idea that educators know best, and act accordingly on the various issues of racial integration, social, and political educational programs. The reformers trust that the educator knows how to teach Johnny to read. What they doubt is that he knows how best to teach Juan or Maria how to become involved in the political process of the community, or how to encourage them to pursue a college degree.[1] Some have blamed educational

[1]For an interesting discussion of the emphasis on the schools' curriculum and achievement see A. Harry Passow, Toward Creating a Model Urban School System: A Study of the Washington, D.C. Public Schools (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1967). See also Thomas H. Eliot, "Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics," American Political Science Review, 53 (December, 1959), 1032-1051.

shortcomings on the structure of the educational institution and see structural change as a means of changing school policy. This line of reasoning assumes that structural change will lead to different relationships between actors in the decision-making process and thus to a different type of policy.

Nevertheless, many of the large city schools are financially dependent on local government, yet their propensity for innovation does not differ significantly from the fiscally independent school. Case studies conducted on fiscally independent and dependent districts finds both types of districts resistant to meaningful innovation. It may be wrong to assume that a change in the structural arrangements will lead to a different power relationship between the core constituencies. A change in structure does not guarantee a change in who controls school policy. The assumption that specific structural arrangements are related to distributions of power in the school decision-making process needs to be examined.[1]

In addition to the need for an analysis of the relationship of the structural arrangement to school policy and changes in power, there is a need for an assessment of the informal structural change that is occurring presently. The actual current working relationship between schools and local government needs to be outlined. Both educators and political scientists

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[1]H. Thomas James, James Kelly and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States (Stanford University School of Education, 1966). James, et al., have suggested that size of school district may be itself be an important factor determining who has influence in the budgetary process. They believe that increased school district size leads to greater complexity in the budgetary process and "consequently, a substantial part of the control of the budget process passes into the hands of the bureaucracy itself, simply because of the size and complexity of the system's operation," p. 76.

agree that formal structural variables are not always accurate indicators of the school-local government relationship. The political scientist claims that schools are usually autonomous regardless of the structural arrangement. Salisbury reflects this attitude when he explains the insulation of the schools from many community demands:

> . . . Perhaps in larger part, however, the insulation of the schools may be a function of the ideology, propagated by schoolmen but widely shared by the larger public, that schools should be free from "politics," i.e., the influence of nonschool officials. Insofar as this view is shared, it has made formal independence a less relevant variable and most of what evidence we have suggests that the formal structure of school-city relations does not matter very much: the schools are largely autonomous anyway.[1]

However, some educators are now claiming that schools are not autonomous regardless of the structural relationship between schools and local government. They claim that the increasing demands of the federal government, minorities and parents have forced the schools to become a part of the metropolitan political system despite structural arrangements. They argue that many community agencies are making decisions regarding community issues that have significant impact on the schools, and yet they have no means of influencing these decisions. School administrators feel that they are pressed by the community into programs before they have had adequate time to evaluate them. School personnel feel that "the school is being forced into different relationships with community and governmental groups" and that one of the main problems now confronting the superintendent is "finding new ways to handle

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[1]Robert H. Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City," Harvard Educational Review, 37 (1967), 408-424. Copyright (c) 1967 by President and Fellow of Harvard College.

effectively these new relationships..."[1] We need to know the new type of political pressures that are being placed upon educators, their adjustments to these pressures and the structural changes that are taking place in response to this increased burden.

The examination of the relationship between the structural arrangements and school input has shown only that the two types of structural arrangements do not differ significantly when compared on the basis of school input. This comparison does not clarify the relationship of different strucutral arrangements and school policy and thus more information is needed before we can strongly endorse structural change as one solution to our school and community problems.

Having found that dependence vs. independence does not affect educational resources, we must now explore whether different structural arrangements result in different policies or different allocations of resources. Does the independent school district allocate its resources differently than the dependent district? Are schools which are under the control of general-purpose local government more likely than independent schools to spend money on reading programs for minorities? When parents and municipal public officials are involved in the decision-making process, do schools spend a smaller percentage of their total budget on "administration" and more on community service activities? As

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[1] School administrator's remarks at Superintendent Conference. The authors do not identify the individual. See Keith Goldhammer, et al., Issues and Problems in Contemporary Education Administration (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1967), p. 13.

the number of actors in the decision process changes, how do spending patterns change? These questions need to be answered before an evaluation can be made of the hypothesis that structural change will produce positive benefits for the entire community. The accepted assumption is that structure affects the power of each actor in the decision-making process. Political scientists assume that structural changes would lead to different school policy because the educator would then no longer have a monoply of power over school policy. The validity of this assumption remains to be tested. An evaluation of the relationship of the structure of school and local government to school policy would provide insight into the power position of the educator in the school policy area. The examination of school policy, as related to structural arrangements, is one of the next steps in the analysis of the importance of the school-local government relationship.

APPENDIX A

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT

FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS

Independent School Districts: Administrative and fiscal responsibility for public schools rests solely with school districts which are independent governmental units.

Dependent School Districts: Those school systems which lack sufficient autonomy to be classified as independent governmental units and are treated as dependent agencies of some other government—county, municipality, town or township, state.

	School Districts		Student Enrollment Elementary and Secondary			
	Independent School Districts	Dependent School Districts	Independent Total Through Grade 12	%	Dependent Total Through Grade 12	%
United States	15,781	1,457	37,472,002	(81)	8,705,838	(19)
Alabama	126	0	796,041	(100)	0	(0)
Alaska	0	29	0	(0)	83,646	(100)
Arkansas	388	0	447,601	(100)	0	(0)
Arizona	237	4	463,950	(99)	2,573	(1)
California	1,132	0	4,880,569	(100)	0	(0)
Colorado	187	0	576,291	(100)	0	(0)
Connecticut	14	155	20,810	(4)	636,526	(96)
Delaware	25	1	122,104	(88)	15,327	(12)

Data source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. 1: Governmental Organization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

SURVEY OF SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS (cont.)

District of Columbia	0	3	0 (0)	140,959 (100)
Florida	94	0	1,579,612 (100)	0 (0)
Georgia	189	0	1,091,059 (100)	0 (0)
Hawaii	0	1	0 (0)	183,083 (100)
Idaho	117	0	185,118 (100)	0 (0)
Illinois	1,177	0	2,362,112 (100)	0 (0)
Indiana	315	0	1,276,245 (100)	0 (0)
Iowa	463	0	652,997 (100)	0 (0)
Kansas	331	0	503,822 (100)	0 (0)
Kentucky	191	0	719,635 (100)	0 (0)
Louisiana	66	0	848,564 (100)	0 (0)
Maine	78	213	103,587 (43)	141,557 (57)
Maryland	0	33	0 (0)	919,943 (100)
Massachusetts	51	322	67,245 (6)	1,120,792 (94)
Michigan	647	0	2,183,634 (100)	0 (0)
Minnesota	445	2	919,576 (99)	3,763 (1)
Mississippi	162	0	524,256 (100)	0 (0)
Missouri	636	0	1,068,786 (100)	0 (0)
Montana	552	0	176,795 (100)	0 (0)
Nebraska	1,374	0	337,786 (100)	0 (0)
Nevada	17	0	131,072 (100)	0 (0)
New Hampshire	158	9	112,221 (68)	52,593 (32)
New Jersey	527	82	1,082,453 (71)	425,429 (29)
New Mexico	89	0	301,895 (100)	0 (0)
New York	746	34	2,190,707 (62)	1,329,606 (38)

SURVEY OF SCHOOL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS (cont.)

North Carolina	0	206	0 (0)	1,185,843 (100)
North Dakota	386	1	145,786 (99)	251 (1)
Ohio	640	0	2,429,769 (100)	0 (0)
Oklahoma	657	0	615,867 (100)	0 (0)
Oregon	353	0	475,607 (100)	0 (0)
Pennsylvania	528	3	2,342,468 (99)	7,752 (1)
Rhode Island	3	37	3,565 (2)	191,633 (98)
South Carolina	93	0	633,917 (100)	0 (0)
South Dakota	228	0	164,724 (100)	0 (0)
Tennessee	14	133	14,392 (12)	88,681 (88)
Texas	1,174	2	2,698,332 (99)	9,485 (1)
Utah	40	0	306,003 (100)	0 (0)
Vermont	272	0	103,475 (100)	0 (0)
Virginia	0	134	0 (0)	1,075,103 (100)
Washington	317	0	807,592 (100)	0 (0)
West Virginia	55	0	404,251 (100)	0 (0)
Wisconsin	417	50	692,005 (69)	309,230 (31)
Wyoming	70	0	85,977 (100)	0 (0)

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